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Abstract 
This essay is a critical exploration ofKwame Anthony Appiah's race theory. I 
examine the two d istinct projects that make up this theory. The first project is an 
analytical project in which he utilizes method s from the philosophy of language to 
examine our beliefs about race. Furthermore, he attempts to d iscover whether there is 
anything that correspond s to these beliefs about race. The second project is normative. 
In this project, he asserts based on the analysis from his first project that there are no 
human races. He offers solutions on how to approach race, racial id entity, and racism 
given the fact that races d o  not exist. Several criticisms of Appiah 's theory are also 
examined as well as the liberal found ations that und ergird his analysis. 
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Introduction 
In American society, race is considered to be a valid and generally 
uncontroversial system of human categorization. In fact, many ofus have great pride for 
our respective racial groups. We often consider race to be a relevant factor in 
constructing our private and social lives. For instance, we make reference to race when 
trying to determine the population(s) from which we choose our :friendships and life 
partners or when deciding what clothes, music, cars, and houses we are going to 
purchase. Sometimes, race is even a consideration when it comes to deciding what and 
where we should teach our children. Race, in essence, is simply a fact of American life. 
Of course, we have seen a change in our societal views towards race. We tend to 
be cautious in how we refer to particular races. Terminologies that were in the past 
commonplace today are considered obscene. Yet contradictions still exist. While we 
have race specific TV channels and products marketed specifically toward blacks, the 
images and products being sold still reflect the old ways of looking at blacks as violent, 
hypersexual misogynists. Perhaps it is time for us to ask ourselves "Why after so many 
years of dealing with race it is still such an important aspect of our daily lives and 
conception of self?" 
There have been many attempts to understand the nature of the race phenomena in 
Western society. While other philosophers attempt to explore race in socio-historical, 
classist, metaphysical, or scientific contexts, Kwame Anthony Appiah offers a different 
approach. He seeks to explain the concept of race in hopes of understanding its journey 
into the American vernacular and societal consciousness. The purpose of this essay will 
be to explore Appiah's critical race theory. It will be demonstrated why Appiah arrives at 
the conclusion that "there are no races." 
In Chapter 1, I will present an exegesis of Appiah's racial theory. I shall explore 
Appiah's usage of two methods borrowed from the philosophy oflanguage for his racial 
analysis: the ideational and referential views of meaning. These two methods encompass 
the analytical project in his theory. I will first follow Appiah as he utilizes the ideational 
method and takes a historical journey into the past in an attempt to understand how 
thinkers once talked about race. This will allow us to better understand how our current 
understanding ofrace came into being. Secondly, I will explore Appiah's use of the 
referential method, in which he attempts to seek out a referent in the world that matches 
our past and current beliefs about race. As we shall see, race is unique insofar as it has 
maintained power and become an often-dominating force in many of our lives while 
lacking ideational coherence and objective validity. This, in itself, differentiates it from 
more arbitrary terms of categorization. During my exposition, I shall briefly offer some 
of my own concerns about Appiah's methodology. Furthermore, I will also examine the 
second project of his theory. In this normative project, Appiah offers assertions 
regarding racialism, racism, racial identity, as well as his conclusion that we may need to 
put to rest the idea of race as a substantive part of who we are. 
Chapter 2 of this essay will take up some of the concerns offered by Appiah's 
critics. First, I will examine at some length Paul C. Taylor's criticisms of both Appiah's 
analytical and normative projects. Taylor takes issue with Appiah's claims that past race­
talk was steeped in racial essentialism and also Appiah' s suggestion that we should 
possibly move beyond racial identities. Secondly, I will address the concerns of Michelle 
Moody-Adams, who offers a different line of criticism of Appiah's suggestion that we do 
away with racial identities. In this chapter, I will suggest possible accommodations as 
well as rebuttals to these criticisms. I will close this chapter with my own line of 
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criticism in which I contend that Appiah treads too lightly when he offers a tentative 
endorsement of racial identities only then to go on to assert that we must ultimately move 
beyond these identities. 
In Chapter 3, I will briefly examine Appiah's liberal foundations and demonstrate 
how they are used as a basis for both his racial analysis and subsequent rejection of race. 
The focus of this section will be Appiah's moral and political commitment to liberalism. 
I will attempt to show that Appiah's liberalism coupled with the liberal vision of Amy 
Gutmann provides for a better understanding of the overall aims and applicability of 
Appiah's theory. If we better understand his moral and political commitments, we will 
better understand his conclusions. 
I will conclude this essay by offering some final thoughts explaining why I think 
that we should endorse both Appiah's quest for truth and his rejection of race. 
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Chapter 1: Appiah's Theory 
Section 1.1: Introduction 
The crux ofKwame Anthony Appiah's race theory is found in the essay entitled 
"Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections." This essay appears in the book 
Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race. As I have stated, this race theory 
consists of two distinct projects. The first project is both analytical and sociological. In 
this project he seeks to explore the foundations of our societal views regarding race. 
Many racial theorists and activists have inadvertently endorsed the presupposition that 
race is a legitimate entity by focusing primarily on the consequences of race in society, 
e.g. racism. Appiah holds, however, ifwe are to speak of the effects of race in Western 
society, then it is important that we first understand the meaning of race and that we 
explore the validity of race as an objective and valid system of categorization. It is at this 
foundational level that Appiah focuses the analytical project. 
The second project of Appiah's race theory is normative. Appiah offers three 
key conclusions resulting from his analysis of race. These three conclusions serve as 
both the essay's thesis and what I take to be the heart of his overall race theory. The first 
assertion is that "American social distinctions cannot be understood in terms of the 
concept ofrace." 1 According to Appiah, our current views on race are a misinformed 
hybridization of semantics, metaphysics, and science. He will term this hybridization 
"racialism." Appiah will contend there are no human races, just the human race itself. 2 
Race and even racism are the products of racialism and thereby should be understood as 
such. 
1 Appiah, Kwame Anthony and Amy Gutmann. Color Conscious. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996.p.32 
2 Ibid. 
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Secondly, he holds that since race is not a legitimate entity, "culture" is not an 
adequate replacement for the social distinctions that we attribute to race. Instead Appiah 
will offer a tentative endorsement of the term "racial identity" as a more suitable 
alternative to "race." However, he further concludes that even "racial identity" is 
ultimately an unsuitable means to negate race-based discriminatory ideology within the 
American paradigm. He states, 
" ... that there is a danger in making racial identities too central to our conceptions 
of ourselves: while there is a place for racial identities in a world shaped by 
racism, I shall argue, ifwe are to move beyond racism we shall have, in the end, 
to move beyond current racial identities." 3 
Since we hold race so central to our identities, Appiah's conclusions will likely appear 
controversial at first glance. However, his analysis and dismantling of "race" will 
demonstrate that these assertions must be strongly considered if we are to take the 
autonomy, freedom, and dignity of persons seriously in liberal society. Let us now begin 
our exploration of Appiah's analysis. 
Section 1.2: Appiah's Methodology 
Race related issues are generally subjects examined by the ethics-related areas of 
philosophy such as social and political philosophy. While these disciplines have been 
somewhat successful in illuminating racial problems, Appiah believes that in order to 
adequately engage in an inquiry that will provide a more holistic picture of race, a more 
sophisticated philosophical toolbox is needed. He states, ''technical philosophy can be of 
the greatest help in clarifying our moral predicament; and to show that what can be 
helpful lies as much in the spheres of metaphysics and epistemology and philosophy of 
3 Ibid. 
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language as it does in the field of ethics."4 Thus, Appiah chooses two primary methods 
borrowed from the philosophy of language to achieve his analytical goals. 
The first of these methods is the ideational theory of meaning derived from 1 ?1h 
century philosophy. 5 Appiah's version of this theory is a variation of British philosopher 
Frank Ramsey's approach, which Appiah refers to as a "strict criteria! theory."6 Ramsey's 
ideational theory requires that we gather people's beliefs about words. Those criteria! 
beliefs will act as rules for understanding the meaning of words in the context of a given 
community. To hold these criteria! beliefs that correspond to a particular word is to 
understand what that words means. The reason that this criteria! theory is considered 
"strict" is that for an object to be denoted by a particular term, all of the criteria! beliefs 
must be true of that object.7 Let us take, for example, the word "bald." If we were to 
gather the criteria! beliefs about "bald" within American society, then we might produce 
beliefs such that bald denotes having little or no hair or consisting of a smooth surface. 
One who believes that "bald" denotes these beliefs can be said to understand the meaning 
of "bald" as spoken in the English language. Under the strict criteria! theory, we would 
then look to the world to see if anything satisfies all of the criteria of those beliefs. If a 
candidate is found that satisfies all of the criteria, then we can assert that such a thing 
exists. If we find that nothing satisfies the criteria, then the logical conclusion is that such 
a thing does not exist. Hypothetically, finding an object in the world that meets all the 
criteria for "bald" under Ramsey's ideational view could be potentially easy, given the 
criteria! beliefs that I have provided. All that would be needed is to find an object that 1) 
4 Ibid., p. 33 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 35 
7 Ibid., p. 35-36 
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has little or no hair and 2) has a smooth surface. Under the strict criteria} view all the 
criteria are satisfied. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that "bald[ ness ]" exists. 
According to Appiah, if we were to utilize Ramsey's strict criteria} theory, 
proving that races do not exist could be quite simple. All that would be necessary is that 
we would find a criteria that all of us believe to be true about races and demonstrate that 
there is nothing that satisfies that criteria. 8 Furthermore, in regard to race, some of our 
criteria} beliefs are often substantively different or even contradictory. For instance, 
some people may hold that race is purely a social construct while others believe human 
races to be a biological fact. Competing criteria} beliefs lessens the effectiveness of a 
strict criteria} theory. If one person were to believe that a race is and only is A and 
another person were to believe that a race is and only is not A, the conclusion under the 
strict criteria} theory would be that the persons who hold each of these particular beliefs 
do not understand the meaning of race.9 The strict criteria} theory requires universal 
endorsement of all criteria} beliefs to determine meaning. 
Appiah holds that it may indeed be possible to find criteria} beliefs that are both 
necessary and sufficient to understand race. These beliefs would be ones that "everybody 
who understands the word 'race' must have and such that everybody who has them 
understands the concept ofrace." 10 However, if such criteria} beliefs existed, they could 
also prove to be problematic under a strict criteria} theory. He goes on to say that if, 
" ... these rather uncontroversial looking claims tum out to be ones that can be 
denied by some who understands the word "race," then one might begin to 
8 Ibid., pp. 34-37 
9 Ibid., p. 36 
10 Ibid. 
7 
wonder whether any claims tum out to be necessary: and if none are necessary 
then certainly the conjunction of necessary conditions won't be sufficient."11 
To avoid these problems that could arise from using a strict criterial theory for his 
analysis, Appiah opts instead for what he calls a "vague criterial theory." He posits the 
following definition for his theory: "race is something that satisfies a good number of the 
criterial beliefs."12 He suggests that even a vague criterial theory has its problems. It 
accompanies with it the fact that criterial beliefs are not universally held (implicit in the 
idea of"a good number"). Despite this drawback, Appiah contends that a vague criterial 
theory is useful for his analytical project. He states that it will allow us "to explore the 
sorts of things people believe about what they call 'races' and to see what races would 
have to be like for these things to be true of them." Furthermore, a vague criterial theory 
"permits us to inquire as to whether the current science suggests there is something in the 
world like that."13 If there are no objects in the world that satisfy the vague criteria, then, 
as with the strict criteria, we must conclude that there are no races. For Appiah, however, 
such a conclusion would not negate the necessity for such an investigation. He contends 
that it is still important that we understand the beliefs that we hold and the culture 
surrounding those beliefs even if these beliefs tum out to be in error. 14 What is implicit 
in Appiah's view here is that even false beliefs can have cultural ramifications and 
consequences. 15 Therefore, we can see how Appiah's methodology allows for both an 
analytic and sociological inquiry. 
11 Ibid. 
12 lbid. He credits his altering of Ramsey's theory to Wittgenstein's conception ofa criterion. 
13 Ibid., p. 37 
14 Ibid., p. 38 
15 This will be of great importance when we turn our discussion towards racialism, extrinsic racism, and 
intrinsic racism. 
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Appiah takes a historical approach in his ideational theory. A historical ideational 
method permits us to trace the ideational views of persons in the past to those in the 
present thus providing Appiah the means to demonstrate that the concept of race is not a 
series of constant historical conjunctions. In other words, some may argue that our past 
ways of thinking about race are distinctly different than current ways. Appiah's 
ideational method will be able to test the validity of such a claim by demonstrating that 
our current ways of thinking about race are actually a continuation or evolution of old 
ways. 
This ideational method is used in conjunction with a second primary method, a 
version of the "causal theory of reference".16 For Appiah, this theory represents an 
"intersection of the philosophy oflanguage and the philosophy of science." 17 The 
version of the referential theory that Appiah chooses to utilize will tell us that if we are to 
find out what a word means then we need to explore the "best causal explanation of the 
central features of uses of that word."18 He explains that under this theory ifwe want to 
know what a particular term means then we need to look to the world to find the object to 
which that term refers or that evokes the usage of that term. So, for example, if we want 
to know the meaning of "bald" then we need only find the object that caused the 
inception of the term "bald" or that thing in which persons first referred to as "bald." 
Similarly,. a referential account of race will require that we do a historical investigation of 
the word "race" so that we are able to find the object that was its initial cause. 19 An 
investigation of this sort will allow us to bring clarity to our current usage of the term. If 
16 Ibid., p. 39 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
I 
9 Ibid., p. 40 
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through the course of the investigation it is found that no referent for race exists, then 
under referential theory we must conclude that races do not exist. 
Appiah acknowledges that there are past examples in which thinkers were 
mistaken when speaking of objects. Intellectuals would often give terms to particular 
objects believing them to be a certain kind of thing that turned out to be different in 
nature. Appiah offers two historical examples of this occurrence: British chemist Sir 
Humphrey Davy who used the term "acid" to denote what turned out to be "proton 
donors" and French philosopher Rene Descartes who denoted the term "animal spirits" as 
existing in our nerve fibers when in actuality what really existed were "truths about 
sodium pumps and lipid bilayers and synapses. "20 In both of these cases these thinkers 
were guilty of making descriptive errors about objects that turned out to be more complex 
than they were aware. These errors are attributable to the scientific limitations of their 
respective times. 
In regard to "race," if it turns out that the criteria! beliefs that are collected are 
mistaken, the referential theory will again prove itself useful. Appiah states that it 
permits us to "explore the history of the way the word "race" has been used and see if we 
can identify through that history some objective phenomenon that people were 
responding to when they said what they said about races."21 
We can see that the ideational and referential theories have a symbiotic 
relationship in Appiah 's racial analysis. Indeed, Appiah asserts that each of these 
methods necessitates the other's usage. He states that the "referential theory requires that 
we do a historical version of what the ideational theory permits us to do. On the 
20 Ibid., pp. 38-40 
21 Ibid., p. 40 
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referential theory, exploring the history of the term is central to understanding what it 
means. Semantical considerations thus steer us toward a historical inquiry."22 An 
inquiry using both of these methods meets Appiah's technical standards. The ideational 
approach should reveal not only our beliefs about race, but also the complex natures of 
those beliefs. Furthermore, we will be permitted to see whether or not there is anything 
that exists that both evoked and that can accommodate such complexities. 
So, Appiah's approach offers us much in the way of tangible value. It will give us 
the object of race itself by requiring that on the ideational approach we find an actual 
object that corresponds to our beliefs about race. Similarly, with the referential view the 
imperative is that we search for an object that corresponds to race. This will allow 
Appiah to provide both an analysis and an adequate normative solution that will be better 
suited than those theories that 1) assume the existence of race, 2) give power to our 
pragmatic beliefs, regardless of their validity, that have managed to survive only because 
we hold these beliefs to be true and 3) that seem to disregard the findings of science. 
Before beginning his ideational and referential analysis of race, Appiah seeks to 
find subjects that will be best suited for this investigation. As mentioned before, the 
word "race" as it is used in the common vernacular will likely provide a broad and 
sometimes conflicting collection of criteria! beliefs in Western society. For instance, one 
race is considered by some to be a social construct that has, over time, gained fictional 
meaning and subsequent societal acceptance. This is not, however, a popular view in 
western society. Most people likely feel that race reflects some undeniable biological, 
morai or cultural reality about persons. We can now understand the benefits from 
Appiah's choice of a historical version of the ideational method. It prevents having to sift 
22 Ibid., p. 41 
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through the ambiguity and conflict that would occur when collecting criteria! beliefs. It 
makes it possible to collect past societal criteria! beliefs about race because ultimately, as 
Appiah states, our "current ways of talking about race are the residue, the detritus, so to 
speak, of earlier ways of thinking about race."23 
Appiah narrows the scope of this investigation to persons who would have been 
considered the elite thinkers of the past. These intellectuals were regarded as the leading 
authorities of their time and would have had great influence in their respective societies 
because of their expertise. Focusing on intellectuals of the past will allow us to witness 
the term being applied in what were thought at the time as appropriate ways. The term 
"race," according to Appiah, was regarded as a scientific term. Appiah concentrates his 
study on two great thinkers of the past, Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Arnold. 24 
In sum, Appiah recognizes that race is an important aspect of our lives. He 
believes that if we are to understand the nature of race then it is important that we 
understand our beliefs about race. However, he holds that our current beliefs about race 
are inherited from past generations. Therefore, Appiah constructs a method borrowing 
parts of both the ideational and referential views of meaning that will allow us to explore 
the origin of our views about race. Then, we will be able discover whether there were 
objects to which those beliefs correspond. Let us now examine Appiah's methodology in 
application. 
23 Ibid., p. 38 
24 Ibid., p. 41 
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Section 1.3: Race and ldeational Method 
Thomas Jefferson believed that blacks are entitled to liberty. However, he felt that 
whites and blacks could not exist in harmony under a sovereign political rule.25 His fear 
was that the consequences of long running animosities between what he considered the 
two different races of people would cause social unrest. Jefferson felt the white race 
would continue to harbor prejudices against the black race, while blacks, unable to forget 
the oppression brought against them by whites, would continue to hold animosity. This 
would only exacerbate the already existing tensions between them, further dividing the 
races, and thereby bring about social instability. 26 Jefferson's views in this regard 
demonstrate both the cultural and social dimension of his beliefs about race. The 
invocation of race to mark pre-existing socio-cultural groups, then, seems practical in 
regard to these potentially socially destabilizing events. 
However, Jefferson's analysis goes far beyond merely describing two groups 
potentially at odds for socially contingent reasons. He goes on to make biological and 
moral claims about the characteristics of blacks and even suggests that these 
characteristics could cause further instability between the two races. Appiah notes that 
Jefferson 
" . . .  continues to talk about physical matters and their aesthetic consequences­
hairlessness, kidneys, sweat-before moving on to discuss questions of the moral 
character of the Negro--bravery, lustfulness, crudeness of feeling (no "tender, 
delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation"), shallowness (those transient 
25 Ibid., p. 43. It is important to note here we have a setting of the stage on how liberal ideology is coupled with racial ideology that perhaps facilitates a means for oppression to exist in a liberal democracy for reason not of hate. This leads me to believe that the use of Thomas Jefferson serves an even greater symbolic purpose than that represented in Appiah 's thesis in "Color Conscious" coupled with his affirmation of the liberal tradition. 
26 Ibid., p. 44 
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griefs )-and ends, at last, with the intellectual capacities-or rather, incapacities of 
black people."27 
In addition, one's race, indicated by phenotype, determined one's physical beauty as well 
as her artistic and literary capabilities. For Jefferson, these factors were bound and given 
mandate by nature. Appiah holds, then, that Thomas Jefferson used race not only to 
denote a phenomenon that is cultural and social, but also to denote biological objects. 28 
Appiah points out, however, that biology was not a discipline in Thomas 
Jefferson's time. Rather, intellectuals like Jefferson drew upon what is called "natural 
history." This field lacked the rigorous discipline and sophistication of contemporary 
science and therefore combined the culturaL psychological, physical variables as 
demonstrated by Jefferson's own words.29 So, it is understandable why Jefferson 
believed race to be the indicator of some kind of natural essence--a racial essence. For 
Jefferson, this essence binds members of groups together and makes them distinguishable 
from other groups in ways that transcend the biological and move into the moral, literary, 
and aesthetic realms. 
Jefferson 's way of thinking about race is what Appiah refers to as "racialism." It 
is the idea that ''we could divide human beings into a small number of groups, called 
'races, '  in such a way that the members of these groups shared certain fundamental, 
heritable, physical, moral, intellectual, and cultural characteristics with one another that 
they did not share with members of any other race."30 
27 Ibid., p.48 
28 Ibid., pp. 43, 49 
29 Ibid., p. 49 
30 Ibid., p. 54 
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For Appiah, racialism is even more pronounced a century after it was heralded by 
Jefferson, most notably by the late 1 9th century British intellectual Matthew Arnold. 
Arnold, along with his some of his contemporaries, believed that race explained both the 
variation of physical characteristics and the moral and literary dispositions of groups. 
Furthermore, such characteristics could be hybridized as a result ofbiological 
intermingling between these groups. For Arnold, one could look to the literature and see 
the essences of the various races that have combined to make up the English race. In 
other words, the moral qualities exhibited by particular groups, both positive and 
negative, would be passed down through generations by way of miscegenation. The 
mixing of races in this regard would exhibit itself stylistically in English literature.3 1  
English literature, for example, represented the combining of the genetic makeup of 
Celtic and Saxon ancestries, rather than cultural or social intermingling. Like Thomas 
Jefferson's racialism, Arnold's racialism demonstrates the passing on and mixing of 
racial essences that extend beyond our physiology and into the products of our artistic 
creation. 
Appiah points out another important manifestation of Matthew Arnold's 
racialism, a solid racialist structure. Arnold is able to make appeals to both intra-racial 
and inter-racial similarities when explaining, for example, distinctions between groups 
like the Saxons and Celts who fall into the "Indo-European" racial paradigm. Groups 
may appear phenotypically different, but a common racial essence exhibited through 
literature and character would be apparent. With this example, Arnold is using race to 
assert sameness between groups. This bears similarity in structure to the American racial 
paradigm. Appiah states, 
31 Ibid., pp. 56-57 
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"When we need differences, we can move lower down the taxonomic tree. 
In the United States, the differences between Irish and Anglo-Saxons could be 
used to account for the cultural and moral deficiencies-real or imaginary-of 
Irish immigrants: but their whiteness could be used to distinguish them from the 
Negro."32 
Appiah holds that the racialism of Arnold is problematic for several reasons. One 
of these is that Arnold lacks an inheritance theory that would explain how exactly 
physiological, moral, and cultural characteristics are passed on and mixed through 
interbreeding. Furthermore, there is no explanation of how to distinguish the impact of 
nature and nurture when trying to distinguish or to predict racial characteristics. We are 
also left asking as to how racial essences (nature) take precedence over the external 
effects of cultural influences (nurture)? Arnold's racialism is unsupported and even 
contradicted by what was known in science about biological interactions at the time. 
Appiah states, "Without answers to questions such as these, however, what is 
masquerading as an empirical, even a scientific, theory is remarkably insensitive to 
evidence. "33 
Up to this point, Appiah has demonstrated that the inheritance of racial essences 
was both incoherent and scientifically ignorant. However, racialism remained widely 
accepted in society. Intellectuals, given the limited too ls of science and culture of the 
day, managed to further complicate the meaning of race. Furthermore, he has 
demonstrated that the racialist paradigm gained a certain amount of structure from the 
18th century well into the 19th century. 
32 Ibid., p. 59 
33 Ibid., p. 61 
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This is not to say that Appiah's analysis, thus far, is without fault. It was 
previously stated that Appiah ho Ids that our current societal ideas about race are the 
"residue" of intellectuals of the past. However, Appiah's theory lacks a strong inheritance 
theory of its own--one that will answer the question in what ways and how have the 
racialist structures of Jefferson's and Arnold's time survived into the present? It could 
be argued that "race" of the past reflects something very different than race today. An 
inheritance theory would demonstrate how metaphysics and bad science have remained 
in the social consciousness over time. Modem day examples of race-talk that directly 
reflect the criteria} beliefs of Jefferson and Arnold would provide a solid link from past to 
present racial ideology. There is no doubt that such examples would shed light on the 
claim that current beliefs about race, not just the term "race" itself, are connected to these 
o Id beliefs. 
Indeed, there are many modem examples of the racialism of Jefferson and Arnold. 
Consider that some regard one's race as a reliable indicator for natural musical adeptness. 
For instance, it is a common assertion that persons designated as members of the black 
race have some metaphysical characteristic called "rhythm" or "soul" thought to be fixed 
by nature. A second example is that blacks are often thought to have some type of 
natural athletic prowess as reflected in the often-made claim that black people are 
naturally gifted at running, basketball, footbati etc. Other examples can take a more 
negative spin, such as the claim that blacks are intellectually inferior, violent, or 
hypersexual. This is not to say that Appiah does not recognize that these types of 
examples exist in contemporary ideology, as we shall later see. However, he falls short 
in his analysis by failing to present a more complete and compelling account of race 
despite the fact that the ideational approach would allow for it. By not answering the 
17 
question "What is race for people today?" Appiah's analysis is incomplete. His claim 
that our current ways of thinking about races are the "residue" of old ways is, therefore, 
not fully convincing. After all, some will claim that over time this residue has been 
sanitized. However, given that examples like the ones I have offered exist and are in fact 
commonly held beliefs, Appiah's view is not dismissible. 
It is possible that Appiah intentionally omitted an inheritance theory. A reason 
for this could be the position that after exposing the historical origin of our beliefs as 
false, our current views can be discredited. Then we have sufficient reason to move 
beyond our current criteria! beliefs, as they too would lack proper grounding. He 
succeeds in showing Jefferson' s and Arnold's criteria! beliefs were, at best, speculation 
masquerading as science. If we take this along with their unwarranted metaphysical 
assumptions and non-rigorous anthropological theorizing, there is enough evidence to 
show that these criteria! beliefs are, at best, fictional. Moreover, there is insufficient 
reason to suppose that these historical fictions became legitimate facts over time. 
Appiah shows that the racialism of Jefferson's era did not seem to wane as it 
moved into Arnold's era. The latter era was one in which science was both more 
developed and sophisticated. However, progress in science is not reflected in Arnold's  
views. His race-talk proved more fantastic and speculative than Jefferson's. We can 
infer, then, that race became an entity that began to divorce itself from science. It 
remained scientific mainly in the sense that it was believed that biological, moral, and 
metaphysical characteristics were still fixed in nature. 
Based on Appiah's ideational analysis, we can further conclude that Jefferson's 
and Arnold's confused racial criteria! beliefs continued to be passed on culturally while 
remaining, to a large degree, scientifically unchecked. Therefore, there is not sufficient 
1 8  
reason to think that our current beliefs about race are any less confused than those of the 
elite thinkers of the past. Rather, the evolution of Jefferson's more scientifically based 
beliefs to Arnold's more speculative ones, make it probable that our current beliefs about 
race are even more confused than in the times of their origin. After all, this transition 
represents an expansion from what are considered racial characteristics (moral and 
intellectual characteristics) as being marked by phenotype to also being marked by the 
products of human creation. Hence, Appiah's claim that the current ways that we talk 
about race simply shadow old ways is quite plausible after all. 
The ideational theory has allowed us to see that the criteria} beliefs of the experts 
from whom we inherited our current beliefs were erroneous and therefore warrant the 
conclusion that races do not exist. Thomas Jefferson and Matthew Arnold thought they 
were examining races. At best they were picking out shared characteristics amongst 
often-isolated groups of people and attributing those characteristics to broader groups. 
They were, in essence, creating races. In modem times, this would be something akin to 
attributing characteristics of some African Americans to all persons considered to be 
black and characteristics of some Irish Americans to all persons considered white. The 
fact is that our past beliefs about race are simply not supported by contemporary science. 
Appiah states, "People are the product not of essences but of genes interacting with one 
another and with environments, and there is little systematic correlation between genes 
that fix color and the like and the genes that shape courage or literary genius."34 
As stated previously in this essay, Appiah contends that if we are to understand 
what the term "race" means, then it is especially helpful for us to find something in the 
34 Ibid., p. 72 
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world to which it would most appropriately refer. Let us now turn, then, to Appiah' s 
referential analysis of race. 
Section 1.4: Race and the Referential Method 
Similar to Descartes and Humphrey, Jefferson and Arnold made the mistake of 
improperly using a term to denote phenomena that was quite different in nature than they 
had assumed. Under Appiah' s causal theory, we too, must presume that there was some 
referent to which Jefferson and Arnold were attempting to signify by the term "race". 
This referent must, at the very least, contain some of the characteristics that were 
attributed to race. Therefore, it is Appiah' s task to discover the best candidates for the 
referent of"race."35 He holds that there are two candidates worthy of consideration as 
possible referents for race that could potentially correspond to the beliefs of Jefferson and 
Arnold. 
The first possible referent would be "populations." Appiah defines a population as 
a "community of potentially interbreeding individuals at a given locality."36 However, 
the concept of a population is usually taken to mean that it can vary in its size and 
geographic location such that one population may be included within or overlap with 
another population. Moreover, this conception of race may not be appropriate when 
discussing humans, as it would be to some other species within the field of population 
genetics. Appiah states, 
"What Darwin was talking about evolution, speciation, adaptation can best be 
understood in terms of talk of populations. And the fact is that in many plants and 
animals there are, in fact, local populations that are reproductively isolated from 
35 Ibid., p. 40 
36 Ibid., p. 72. Appiah quotes this definition from Mayr's "Populations, Species, and Evolution." 
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one another, different in clustered and biologically interesting ways, and still 
capable of interbreeding if brought together; and biologists both before and after 
Darwin could have called these "races." It's just that this doesn't happen in 
human beings. In this sense, there are biological races in some creatures, but not 
in us."37 
Appiah further states that one possible way to make populations a suitable referent is by 
broadening the scope of its meaning to include small isolated groups within a given 
locale. This could allow for the possibility of human races ( Appiah offers the Amish as 
such a group ).38  However, this conception of populations does not include Jefferson or 
Arnold's criteria} beliefs, nor does it reflect our current criteria} beliefs in regard to race. 
In W estem society, race is primarily marked by phenotype. People with certain 
often vaguely similar phenotypes are thought to be of the same race regardless of their 
surrounding community, potential breeding pool, geographical location, or diversity of 
ancestry. For instance, a person who was born and raised in Tennessee and a person 
raised in Alaska thought to share certain physical characteristics attributed to a race are 
considered part of the same race. So, consistent with Jefferson's view, skin pigment, hair 
texture, and other facial characteristics are considered to be more reliable racial indicators 
of whether one is "black" regardless of her place of birth. 
Appiah' s second possible candidate as a referent for race would be a group of 
individuals that share certain phenotypical characteristics and are connected to particular 
geographical regions. However, for Appiah these variations of phenotypic characteristics 
are likely to offer nothing helpful to biology. He argues that this particular candidate 
37 Ibid., p. 73 
38  Ibid 
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would be useless in attempting to determine one's  race in the United States, because we 
are far from being a genetically homogeneous country. 39 Persons considered ''white", 
for example, have phenotypical traits and have ancestry traceable to a wide array of 
geographical regions. "White" in this case can include persons of mixed biological 
heritage. A person with one grandmother from Sicily, the other from Ireland, and a 
grandfather from England, and another from Cleveland would be considered white in this 
society as long as their phenotypes are consistent with physical traits generally 
considered as white traits. Being considered ''white" or "black" would have included 
more morphological variation than persons like Jefferson would have imagined. We can 
conclude that such a diverse conception of race would go far beyond the bounds of what 
Arnold considered to be as races as even the Celts and Saxons could be divided up in a 
myriad of races. 
Examples similar to what I have provided are not borderline. Ancestral diversity 
is a fact in American life. If we are to agree with Appiah that we have inherited our 
current views of race, while acknowledging the fact of miscegenation in this country and 
the broadening of our racial categories, then the validity of our entire racial paradigm 
comes into question. Our current "races" may in some ways reflect the criteria! beliefs of 
those who provided our criteria! residue. However, our current conception of race is 
simply far more complex. Ifwe are to consider Appiah's approach to be valid, then we 
must also consider his assertion that there are no races to be valid. Furthermore, "race" in 
the common vernacular does not correspond to the same thing denoted by the term "race" 
when used by Darwin and post-Darwinian scientists. Appiah states, "you can get various 
possible candidates from the referential notion of meaning, but none of them will be 
39 Ibid., pp. 73-74 
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much help explaining psychological and social life, and none of them corresponds to the 
social groups that we call "races" in America. 
,,
4o So, under the referential theory, races 
do not exist. 
One might question Appiah's dismissal of phenotypic markers on the basis of 
their practical use in Western society. For instance, skin color might be useful in helping 
doctors identify people that may be high risk for certain diseases, or in helping police 
capture criminals, or giving us a general idea of one's ancestry. To answer such 
concerns, I offer this reminder: Appiah is not arguing that race does not exist in our 
social reality. To the contrary, as we expand our discussion of racialism and later discuss 
Appiah's normative project, it becomes quite clear that race exists in our social reality. 
Appiah, however, is arguing that human races, as we generally refer to them, do not exist 
as objective facts. It is the mistaken idea that races exist as scientific fact that our current 
beliefs about race are generally grounded. Race categorization as used in the examples 
above may actually affirm our mistaken notions about race. 
I shall now discuss in more detail the scope of racialism to allow us to better 
understand how it fits in with Appiah' s analytical and normative analysis. Furthermore, 
we will be able to see the consequences of a validation of the term "race" whether it is for 
practical, moral, or even ethical reasons. 
Section 1.5: The Racialist Triad: Racialism, Extrinsic Racism, and Intrinsic Racism 
In this section of the essay, I explore the consequences of the invention, 
reification, and subsequent affirmation of the Western conception of race. As we have 
seen, the racialism of persons such as Arnold and Jefferson does not follow the concept 
of race. Rather, racialism was the key aspect in the creation of the race categorization. 
40 Ibid., p. 74 
23 
Even today racialism acts as a fuel used to power the idea of "race." To understand this 
fact is to understand preliminary dangers of racialism and its manifestations. 
So far we have examined in detail K. Anthony Appiah' s linguistic analysis of 
"race" appearing in Color Conscious. The descriptive aspects of racialism, however, are 
presented at greater length in his article entitled "The Conservation of Race." They 
illuminate his purpose and reasoning. I believe that while these aspects are not in his 
primary work, Color Conscious, his discussion of what I shall refer to as his "racialist 
triad" strengthens the foundations of both the analytical and normative parts of his race 
theory. The racialist triad captures what is generally referred to as "racism." This triad 
consists of three separate, but not necessarily distinct doctrines, 1) racialism, 2) extrinsic 
racism, and 3) intrinsic racism. 
As we have seen racialism need not require malicious intent. As Appiah points 
out in Color Conscious, Jefferson's racialism was a means not only to make moral and 
aesthetic assessments about persons and the products of their creation, but also to try to 
separate people for the purpose of preventing societal discontent that would likely occur 
as a result of racial oppression and injustice. And, while Jefferson's racialism was an 
attempt to separate people to maintain social stability, Arnold's racialism was used as a 
means to achieve universality, a coming together of peoples in a literary and artistic 
sense.41 According to Appiah, racialism, when taken alone, does not have to pose a 
serious threat despite its racial essentialism. He states, "that positive moral qualities are 
distributed across the races, each one can be respected, can have its "separate but equal" 
41 Color Conscious pp. 58-59 
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place."42 Here, Appiah is likely referring to what could be an overlap that may occur 
between racialism and some multiculturalist doctrines. While such a relationship may 
not be overtly dangerous, this does not mean that the possibility for potential danger does 
not exist, as we will see when we later address Appiah's assessment of racial identity. 
One of the more dangerous and challenging companions to the idea of race is 
racism. The idea of racism is controversial for Appiah and not as simple as we generally 
take it to be in modem society. This is because the foundational structure of racism is 
racialism. Racialism is "a presupposition of other doctrines that may have been called 
'racism,' and these other doctrines have been, in the last few centuries, the basis of a 
great deal of moral error and the source of a great deal of suffering. "43 
The doctrine of racialism is presupposed by two other racial doctrines provided by 
Appiah. The first of these is what he calls extrinsic racism. He states, "Extrinsic racists 
make moral distinctions between members of different races, because they believe that 
the racial essence entails certain morally relevant qualities. "44 Let us now consider some 
examples of this form of racism. 
A common racialist notion evident in American culture is that black people are 
hypersexual. This notion is further fueled by black exploitation films and the lyrics and 
images made popular by current hip hop and rap culture. So, let us imagine a white 
person named Tommy. Tommy believes the aforementioned characteristic to be factually 
true of blacks and morally repugnant. He, therefore, hates and desires to harm black 
42 Appiah, Kwame Anthony. "The Conservation of 'Race."' Black American Literature Forum 23.1 
�Spring 1989) p. 44. 3 Ibid. He considers racialism as part of a triad racial doctrines. 
44 Ibid., p. 45 
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persons. Under Appiah's view, Tommy is an extrinsic racist he focuses on a particular 
negative moral quality that he believes to have a natural and fixed presence in blacks. 
Now, consider a slightly different scenario. Imagine that there is a positive moral 
quality entailed by being a member of the black race. For instance, imagine that black 
people were thought to have more courage than whites and that this fact was fixed in 
nature. Tommy, being white, considers himself deficient in this moral quality. However, 
he still believes that courage is a moral ideal. As a result, he chooses to both associate 
with and show reverence to black people on the sole basis that the black racial essence 
includes courage. It is the moral quality that is encapsulated by this essence that is of 
importance, rather than race itself. Therefore, Tommy is once again an extrinsic racist. 
Focusing on moral qualities is not the only way to determine whether a person is 
extrinsic racist. Appiah holds that in the face of evidence that contradicts the existence of 
an innate moral quality, a sincere extrinsic racist must cease holding the false belief. So 
if it were demonstrated that not all blacks are either hypersexual or courageous, then 
Tommy would accept this evidence as fact. These two moral qualities would no longer 
be relevant factors for his moral judgments in regard to race. If he fails to reject these 
factors based on the evidence, then the problem may be cognitive. He could simply lack 
the intellectual ability to part himself with such beliefs or understand the evidence. A 
second possibility is that Tommy may be guilty of what Appiah calls intrinsic racism. "45 
Intrinsic racism is the final doctrine of Appiah's racialist triad. He states, 
"intrinsic racists, in my definition, are people who differentiate morally between 
members of different races, because they believe that each race has a different moral 
45 Ibid., p. 45 
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status, q uite ind ep end ent of the m oral c harac teristic s entail ed by its rac ial essenc e.',46 An 
exampl e  of an intrinsic rac ist is the neo- naz i  who fe el s  that bl ack and J ewish p eopl e  are 
worthy of d eath fo r  the sol e  reason that they are bl ack or that they are J ewish. Some 
intrinsic rac ists may ac tuall y attack c ertain moral q ual ities supp osedl y entail ed by 
another' s rac e. For instanc e, neo- naz is oft en refe r to what they bel iev e  are negativ e  
moral c harac teristic s of bl ack s or J ews. T he foc us on these m oral q ual ities m ay app ear to 
be, by App iah' s d efinition, extrinsic rac ism. Howev er, an attack on m oral c harac teristic s 
c an ac t as a front fo r  what is ac tu all y  a d eep- seated resentm ent based on the m oral status 
of a group, rather than p artic ul ar q ual ities. A nother p ossibil ity is that moral q ual ities are 
onl y m eant to serve  as refl ec tions of what is thought to be the d efic ient m oral status of a 
group . B oth of these exampl es are d em onstrations of insinc ere extrinsic rac ism. 
Ul tim atel y, howev er, they expl ic itl y show intrinsic rac ism. 
E xampl es of intrinsic rac ism need not be as ov ert as these ex ampl es. App iah 
asserts that Bl ack N ational ism is a subtl er exampl e  of intrinsic rac ism. He states that 
"W here rac ism is impl ic ated in the basis fo r  national sol id arity, it is intrinsic not 
extrinsic ."47 For App iah, it is a m istak e to think that the foc us of Bl ack N ational ism is 
on m oral c harac teristic s  simpl y  entail ed by one' s rac e. R ather, rac e al one ac ts as the 
d eterm ining fac tor in p rom oting fr atern ity am ong st bl ack s, reg ardl ess of the m oral 
c harac ter of p artic ul ar gr oup mem bers. 48 T he p robl em here is that by using rac e to 
p rom ote fr atern ity, it is inherent that this fr atern ity d isc rim inates ag ainst others on the 
basis of rac e. 
46 Ibid., p. 45 
47 Ibid., p. 47 
48 Ibid., p. 48 
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In sum, extrinsic racism is a problem where the moral judgment is attributable to 
ignorance of fact and/or cognitive incapacity, while intrinsic racism turns its back in the 
face of evidence. Furthermore, intrinsic racism is what Appiah calls a "moral error." He 
states, "even if racialism were correct, the bare fact that someone was of another race 
would be no reason to treat him or her worse--or better--than some one of my race."49 
The real danger of these two racialist doctrines is that they exist as ideologies-they 
inform our personal, social and political judgments. This is evidenced in the fact that 
these racisms commit us to particular racial groups while deeming other groups morally 
inferior or even superior.50 It should be clear why intrinsic racism provides the greater 
threat. It is as much of a dogma as it is an ideo logy insofar as it is decidedly stubborn 
and irrational in its commitment to race as an objective truth and as a legitimate basis of 
judging moral status. 
While some may find Appiah's description of Black Nationalism as intrinsic 
racism controversial, this idea of what he considers to be a racist movement ( created as a 
reaction to social and systematic intrinsic racism) will play a role in our upcoming 
discussion of identities. Just as our views of race are the residue of views held by white 
elites, so are the views of some blacks the residue of reactions to the racial oppression in 
this culture. This is a point to which I will soon return. 
Where do Jefferson and Arnold fit into these racialist doctrines? Appiah does 
not state explicitly that any specific beliefs held by Arnold and Jefferson were racist. 
However, in reference to his analysis in Color Conscious, he states " . .  . it is obvious, I 
think, from the history I have explored, that racism has been central to the development 
49 Ibid. 
50 Appiah, Kwame Anthony. "Racisms" Ethics In Practice. Ed. Hugh Lafollette. Malden: Blackwell, 
1997. p. 379 
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ofrace theory. In that sense, racism has been part of the story all along." 51 For Appiah, 
the story of racism is incomplete without referring to racialist foundations that both fuel 
and undergird it . Therefore, I would argue, that Jefferson and Arnold should both be 
considered extrinsic racists. Both men regarded characteristics thought to be attributable 
to race as morally relevant factors. Since both men at least thought they were working 
from the scientific tools of the time, there is no reason to assume that they held their 
beliefs of be non-falsifiable. Jefferson, for instance, expressed caution in his judgments 
and even held for the possibility that what he regarded as racial characteristics were 
socially contingent. He even went so far as to say that he hoped that his past comments 
regarding the moral capacities ofblacks had been in error.52 
While these thinkers might have expressed extrinsic racism, Appiah feels that 
most of our current views about race are intrinsic racism. It is the fear of "moral 
criticism" that prevents us from overtly expressing our intrinsic racism. 53 This is 
demonstrated in the fact that we continue to hold race as central to our conception of self 
and others. This is despite the fact that there is scientific agreement that race does not 
exist. 54 Other examples include both our continuing usage of the "one-drop rule" for 
determining race and by the fact that so-called racial miscegenation is still largely 
considered a moral taboo. The question becomes, how can we deal with dogmatic racism 
that remains pervasive in our cultural psyches? Appiah insists that the way to combat 
intrinsic racism is by "challenging the racialism it presupposes."55 This assertion gives 
insight into the purpose and means used for his racial investigation appearing in Color 
51 CC p. 82 
52 CC p. 66 
53 CoR p. 49 
54 Zack, Naomi. Race and Mixed Race. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1 993. p. 14 
55 CoR p. 49 
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Conscious. It explains his focus on racialism, as opposed to racism, and for using 
methodology that would expose racialism at the foundational level. 
One thing that follows from Appiah's investigation is that racialism is responsible 
for the development of the race concept and racism. Simply put, without racialism, our 
past and current beliefs about race would have no foundation. Racism presupposes 
racialism and the belief that races exist. It is therefore understandable why Appiah 
asserts "The disappearance of a widespread belief in the biological category of the Negro 
would leave nothing for racists to have an attitude towards." 56 If we rid ourselves of 
racialism, then we subsequently rid ourselves of the products of racialism-namely, race 
and racism. 
This is not the only end that Appiah seeks to accomplish. Up to this point, I have 
demonstrated Appiah's foundational analysis of race. I have also examined the nature 
and consequences of the racialism that both gave rise to and constitute the meaning of 
"race". We shall now tum our focus from Appiah 's analytical project to his normative 
project in which he offers solutions for moving forward morally and politically in the 
wake of the deconstruction of race. 
Section 1.6: Race, Culture and the Normative Project 
If we agree with Appiah that race is a spurious concept founded on racialist 
assumptions, then with what should we replace this concept to explain the social 
distinctions brought about by race? The multiculturalist's answer might be that we 
should make an appeal to culture rather than race because it more accurately explains 
who we are individually. For the multiculturalist, "black", for instance, should become 
56 Ibid p.49 
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(and in many cases has already become) replaced with African-American, because it is 
thought that blacks share a common culture. 
Appiah, however, rejects this appeal to culture. If we define culture as persons 
sharing a common history, mores, folkways, language, dialect and traditions, etc., then it 
is not a given that the people designated as members of races actually share any of these 
aspects of culture. For instance, it is not likely that a white person from rural Mississippi 
shares the same types of cultural practices as an Italian American from New York City. 
Similarly, someone considered black from rural Tennessee is not likely to share the same 
types of cultural practices and relics as a black person from Orange County, California or 
inner city New York. The claim that these persons share a common culture by virtue of 
their phenotype, Appiah asserts, is not something that we should simply assume is the 
case. Rather, such a claim "needs to be argued."57 
In this society, there is an overlap between perceived race and culture. Racial 
indicators, such as phenotype, are the primary tools used to assign particular cultures to 
individuals. So, if we take one of the above examples, something as arbitrary as race is 
generally all that is needed to place the person from Tennessee and the person from 
California in the same culturally homogenous bowl. 58 However, Appiah explains that, 
"African-Americans do not have a single culture, in the sense of shared 
language, values, practices, and meanings. But many people who think of races 
as groups defined by shared cultures, conceive that sharing in a different way. 
They understand black people as sharing black culture by definition: jazz or hip­
hop belongs to an African American, whether she likes it or knows anything about 
57 Ibid., p. 88 
58 Ibid., pp. 84-89 
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it, because it is culturally marked as black. Jazz belongs to a black person who 
knows nothing about it more fully or naturally than it does to a white jazzman. "59 
Appiah calls this phenomenon "cultural geneticism." 60 It means that one's racial 
identity gives one a birthright to belong to particular cultures. Under such a view, we see 
the doctrine of racialism reveal itself. Cultural geneticism is inherently racialist because 
it affirms the idea of some shared essence that connects one to others by virtue of their 
race. Appiah, therefore, rejects our societal conception of racialized culture because it is 
bound to racialism. This is not to say that Appiah does not believe that an African 
American culture cannot exist. To the contrary, he asserts that such cultures do, indeed, 
exist-only many of them. 61 
As we can see, it would be quite difficult to provide an account of culture to 
explain our social distinctions without making reference to one's designated race. 
Therefore, Appiah prefers "racial identities" to cultural identities. Racial identities are, 
for Appiah, better equipped to handle moral and political questions without, necessarily, 
having to appeal to racial essences. Thus, let us now move the focus of our discussion to 
the concept of racial identities. 
Section 1.7: Racial Identity, Ascription, and Identification 
Identities are the labels that we assign to ourselves or that society assigns to us. 
The process in which these identities are assigned, Appiah calls "ascription. "62 
Ascriptive identities are aspects of our lives from which we can derive value and that can 
act as catalysts of great suffering. The complex assortment of available identities, 
59 Ibid., p. 90 60 Ibid. This term was originally coined by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. 
61 Ibid., p. 95 62 Ibid., p. 79 
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whether it be identities such as gay, lesbian, creative, or professor, are often taken to 
represent aspects of who and what we are. 
An important supplement to the concept of identity is what Appiah calls 
identification. He describes this "as the process through which an individual 
intentionally shapes her projects--including her plans for her own life and her conception 
of the good-by reference to available labels, available identities."63 A person guides 
the course of action in her life by her possible identities. For instance, as a part of this 
process of identity building, a person ascribed the label scientist may choose her 
associations, choose schools, read certain journals, eat certain foods, or even live in 
certain places based on this identity. Such a process seems, at first glance, rather 
uncontroversial. Identification could easily be regarded as an exercise of one's 
autonomy, prima facie. In the given example, the scientist is devising a blueprint that 
will allow her to gain value from her life based largely in part to that identity she may 
have chosen-because she is or desires to become who or to what the label "scientist" is 
theoretically committed. 
The problem is, as Appiah asserts, the process of identification is not always 
vo luntary and may actually undermine the idea of autonomy. 64 In regard to racial 
identities, few ofus have chosen to be "black" or "white." They are labels ascribed to us 
in which we have very little say, with the exception being that some ofus are able to 
"pass" as more than one race. 65 Ascriptive identities, then, can potentially be harmful in 
the sense that it lessens our scope of choice. In the case where identities are given to us 
involuntarily, the only choice may be in how important of a place we allow ascribed 
63 Ibid., p. 78 64  Ibid., p. 80 65  Similar examples may apply in regard to gender and sexuality. 
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identities to maintain in our lives--especially when carving out life plans and our 
conception of the good.66 
Appiah holds that there are two different dimensions of individual identity. First, 
there is the personal dimension, which would consist of identities such as bravery, 
creativity, and intelligence. The second dimension of identity is the collective dimension. 
According to Appiah, this area brings together the morally and socially relevant aspects 
of our lives by bridging together our collective identities. These collective identities 
include identities such as gay, Asian, woman, and Catholic-specifically, the social 
categories that exists in society. 67 While our personal identities may have some social 
consequences, the collective dimension is where we find the socially and morally 
significant difficulties of ascriptive identities. 
Section 1.8: Racial Identity and the Problem of Authenticity 
Let us now briefly discuss a problem that arises in regard to how collective 
identities operate within the moral, social, and political spheres. Appiah states that in 
liberal society "we see public morality as engaging each ofus as individuals with our 
individual ' identities. "' He further states, " . . .  we have the notion, which comes . . .  from 
the ethics of authenticity, that, other things being equal, people have the right to be 
acknowledged publicly as what they already really are.',68 In terms of collective 
identities, we often regard these identities as central to who we are. Therefore, we seek 
recognition of these collective identities because recognition of these identities by society 
and by the political structure is a demonstration of respect for our authentic selves. By 
denying persons the right to recognize these identities is asking them to deny our 
66 Ibid . 67 Ibid., 93 
68 Ibid ., 92 
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authentic selves. Such issues are bound to what Charles Taylor has termed the "politics 
of recognition." Appiah defines the politics of recognition as "a politics that asks us to 
acknowledge socially and politically the authentic identities of others.'
,
69 
The politics ofrecognition requires that personal and collective identities are 
centralized by its adherence to ideal of"authenticity," a term also offered by Charles 
Taylor. Authenticity is the idea that, as Taylor states, ''There is a certain way of being 
that is my way. I am called upon to live my life this way . .  . If l  am not [true to mysel�, I 
miss the point of my life." 70 The ideal of authenticity, in relation to racial identity, 
then, would present, for example, black identity as constituting the authentic self. The 
politics of recognition would require that this authentic black self be recognized socially 
and politically. To recognize racial identities, in this regard, is to respect those persons 
as members of races. Appiah states that because "I seek to express myself that I seek 
recognition of an African-American identity. "7 1  
The ideal of authenticity is plagued with several problems for Appiah. The first 
problem relates it to the politics of recognition. The politics of recognition with the ideal 
of authenticity requires more than merely having a racial identity. Appiah argues that it 
requires that we "demonstrate a respect" for our identities, by attempting to secure 
respect from those who hold the very same identities that we seek to resist.72 
This first problem of authenticity exposes a second problem with the ideal. 
Authenticity assumes that as a racial group member that my authentic self is constituted 
independently of other identities. Furthermore, it assumes that the institutions and 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 93-94 This quote, borrowed by Appiah, is taken from Charles Taylor's essay "Multiculturalism 
and the Politics of Recognition." 
7 1 Ibid., p. 94 
72 Ibid. 
35 
traditions of my social environment do not shape my authentic self. This negation of a 
holistic view of social contingency demonstrates a failure of the ideal insofar as it fails to 
recognize that we are "dialogically constituted" by the society around us.73 This fact is 
demonstrated by the need to ascribe racial identities and demonstrate reverence for that 
identity under a politics of recognition. Appiah states that African American identity "is 
centrally shaped by American society and institutions: it cannot be seen as solely 
constructed within African American communities." 74 It is for this reason that Appiah, 
as mentioned earlier, rejects the idea of a singular African American culture and asserts 
that there are instead African American cultures shaped by and in constant dialogue with 
the society from which they originate. 
Appiah presents a final problem that can arise from the ideal of authenticity. He 
argues that this ideal can contain an inherent appeal to essences. It can assert that 
beneath one's skin is a real self there to be expressed, "an authentic nugget of selfhood." 
Such a view shares the same pitfall of the previous problem of authenticity and therefore 
shares its objections. The appeal to an essential essence fails to recognize that the self is 
a product of its surroundings. Furthermore, we shape this self with materials made 
available to us by society-we are dependent on such materials. While an account of 
authenticity that does not contain essentialism may be possible, according to Appiah, we 
must exercise caution. The differentiating factor amongst collective identities is the f3:ct 
some of these identities, like racial identity, are ascribed based on fictional criteria. He 
states of these fiction based identities that "in all of them the story is complex, involves 
'making up people, ' and cannot be explained by an appeal to an essence." 
73 Ibid., p. 95 
74 Ibid., p. 95 
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Thus far, I have provided some of the drawbacks of "racial identity" to account 
for the significance of race in this society: 1 )  involuntary identification and 2) the 
problem of authenticity. There is a third difficulty that arises in regard to racial identity 
in regard to it being a collective identity. A defining feature of collective identities is the 
presence of scripts. Appiah defines scripts as "narratives that people can use in shaping 
their life plans and in telling their life stories."75 Racial identity will certainly have life 
plans, choices, career or otherwise, based on one' s identity as a member of that race for 
purpose of identification. The available scripts for racial identity, like the problem of 
involuntary identification, will be contingent on how much one allows race to be a factor 
in one's  life. 76 Ascriptive racial identities can bring about negative consequences. 
Appiah states that "we expect people of a certain race to behave a certain way not simply 
because they are conforming to the script for that identity, performing that role, but 
because they have certain antecedent properties that are consequences of the label 's 
properly applying to them."77 
If we now revisit the concept of racialism, we can see the potential problems that 
it may present for racial identities. Many blacks, for instance, have inherited the 
racialism in the form of extrinsic racism of Arnold and Jefferson and subsequently the 
sometimes-reactionary intrinsic racism exhibited in Black Nationalism. There can be 
social and psychological affects to the identification process, both of which can impede 
our abilities to conceive and execute our life plans, our :freedom, and our autonomy. For 
instance, scripts provided by an involuntary Black Nationalist model may limit the scripts 
75 Ibid., p. 97 Appiah does not regard this to be a feature of personal identity. He states, for instance being 
witty does not commit one to a script of ''the wit." 
76 Ibid., p. 97 
77 Ibid 
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available to a person. For example, one model may provide scripts that assert that a 
person should only marry a person of the opposite sex who shares a black racial identity, 
be a particular profession or only listen to music that is racially marked "black" 
While Appiah discusses some of the potentially negative consequences that could 
occur as a result of identification and limited number of life scripts, he fails to talk about 
the complexities surrounding conflicting multi-sided identities. Imagine a person, for 
example, who would have ( 1 )  black racial identity that entails a certain set of ascribed 
characteristics and capacities, while having (2) a gay identity that afTrrms the converse of 
those qualities, and (3) a personal identity of "political." For instance, she may desire to 
be a politician. However, a black racial identity may provide only life scripts for political 
life that would conflict with the available scripts for political life provided by her gay 
identity. 
This war of conflicting collective identities could potentially strain both her 
autonomy and freedom. By asserting that our choices will be contingent upon how 
central we make our collective identities, Appiah seems to be placing the burden on the 
person having to make this choice. The process of identification for these identities will 
put her life plans in conflict or perhaps even cause her to repress some of the aspects that 
she may regard as central to her identity. Therefore, it may not be a matter of how 
committed she is to these ascriptive identities but rather how much society forces her to 
commit to these identities. 
While he does not explore in great detail the surplus of potential complex 
intermingling of collective identities, Appiah appears to hope that racial identities will 
ultimately be detached from any straining process of identification. Therefore, if we 
take on racial identities for the purpose of countering the negative consequences that have 
38  
occurred as result of racial demarcation, we must be careful that the racial identities do 
not require too much of us. 
Appiah tentatively states that racial identity without essentialism may be a 
"historically" and "strategically" necessary transition in accounting for the social 
distinctions brought about by race and in ending racism. Unfortunately, he offers no 
examples to demonstrate such a conception of identity. It would not, however, be 
difficult construct such a conception. We can conceive of a racial identity that 
recognizes that race itself was based on false assumptions and therefore does not 
commit itself to foundations of the label itself For instance, there is a fundamental 
difference between saying "We, who are racially marked "black" and who are 
oppressed as a consequence of that demarcation . . . .  " and "We, who are black, want to 
be recognized and respected as black people." The former example is decidedly both 
political and non-essentialist, while the latter example may commit us to some degree 
of racial essentialism." 
Appiah recognizes that even with the use of racial identities that do not appeal 
to essences when attempting to secure social and political respect that there will be 
"expectations to be met" and that "demands will be made."  He goes on to say that, 
''one who takes autonomy seriously will want to ask whether we have not replaced one 
kind of tyranny with another. If l had to choose between Uncle Tom and Black Power, 
I would, of course, choose the latter. But I would like to not have to choose. I would 
like other options."78 
The end result, however, could not only give rise to the potential problems I 
have just discussed, but others as well. Appiah states racial identities, like all 
78 Ibid., p. 99. 
39 
collective identities, can "go imperial," taking primacy over other identities that make 
up who we are. 79 For Appiah then, we need to be careful how much we value the 
fictitious concept of race. Its racialist foundations allow it power over our 
associations, over our desires, our actions--our options. As Appiah states, "It is 
crucial to remember that we are not simply black or white or yellow or brown or gay 
or straight or bisexual, Jewish, Christian, Moslem, Buddhists, or Confucian but that we 
are also brothers and sisters; parents and children; liberals, conservatives, and 
1 ft .  t ,,80 e IS S . . . . 
79 Ibid., p. 1 03 
80 Ibid. 
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Chapter 2 :  Criticisms of Appiah 
Section 2.1:  Introduction 
Considering our previous discussion on both racialism and its consequences, it is 
easy to understand why Appiah expresses that we may ultimately need to move beyond 
racial identities. However, the tenets of Appiah's racial theory do not go without some 
formidable criticism. In this Chapter, I shall briefly explore some of the criticisms 
against Appiah employed by Michelle Moody-Adams and Paul C. Taylor as well as my 
own criticism of Appiah 's normative project. 
Section 2.2: Paul C. Taylor on Appiah's Analytical and Normative Project 
In the article "Appiah' s Uncompleted Argument: W. E. B. Dubois and the 
Reality of Race," Paul C. Taylor offers several strong challenges to Appiah's theory. He 
believes that Appiah is a "racial eliminativist ." This means that Appiah "believes that 
races do not exist, that acting as if they do is metaphysically indefensible and morally 
dangerous." So "eliminating 'race' from our metaphysical vocabularies is an important 
step toward the right or a better-that is to say, a rational and just-worldview."8 1  
Taylor rejects Appiah's eliminativism and presents criticisms of both analytical and 
normative aspects of Appiah's theory. Let us now briefly examine these objections. 
The first challenge Taylor offers is in regard to Appiah's usage of Thomas 
Jefferson and Matthew Arnold. Recall that Appiah uses these two subjects to represent 
the historical origins from which we inherited our current views on race. He holds that 
both of these intellectuals would have been considered experts on race in their day­
people to whom important questions about race could be deferred. Therein lies the 
8 1  Taylor, Paul. "Appiah 's Uncompleted Argument: W. E. B. Dubois and the Reality of Race." Social 
Theory and Practice 26. 1 (Spring 2000). P. 1 03- 104 
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problem for Taylor. Taylor argues that by focusing solely on these two subjects for his 
historical inquiry that Appiah " . . .  renders the history of race-talk in a problematic and 
partisan manner, counting as producers and disseminators of racialist meaning only those 
figures who subscribe to the tenets of classical racialism." He further states, "As a 
consequence, his [Appiah's] explication of "race" is somewhat less than reliable ."82 
Taylor agrees with Appiah that the race-talk of Jefferson and Arnold was steeped 
in racialist language. However, Taylor contends that there were several 19th century 
thinkers who appealed to "race" without utilizing Jefferson and Arnold's racial 
essentialism. To demonstrate this fact, Taylor offers several examples in which 
intellectuals spoke about race in non-racialist terms and who did not contend that it was 
necessary to abolish race-talk altogether. Most of these examples come as a response to 
the "eliminativist strategy" of ''the early black American convention movement." In 
response to this strategy, one of the participants, William Watkins, acknowledged in 1 83 5 
that the foundation of race was faulty but regarded this fact in itself as arbitrary. He 
contended that race had become so "fixed in meaning" within our language that it should 
not be omitted from racial discourse. 83 
Another example also comes from a response to the strategy of the convention 
movement. An anonymous writer claimed that race-based terminology has political 
necessity. The idea here is that race has practical usage for political action when it comes 
to organizing as an oppressed people or as "colored people."84 In both of these examples 
the appeal to race is quite different than the racialist ideology that appears in the works of 
Jefferson and Arnold. In fact, as we can see, such ways of talking about race were meant 
82 Ibid p. 122. 
83 Ibid., p. 124 
84 Ibid. 
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to evoke action against what were perhaps the consequences that occurred as a result to 
racialist thinking. Taylor's point, however, is that Appiah does not present a full picture 
to support his eliminativism and therefore it is not necessary to eliminate all appeals to 
race. A more holistic collection of past criteria! beliefs may mean that we only need to 
eliminate racialist appeals to race. 
This, I believe, is an important challenge to Appiah's theory. It is indeed 
questionable whether Appiah omits thinkers that may contradict his philosophical 
assertions in regard to the history ofracialism. Perhaps, ifhe had taken such accounts 
into consideration his analysis would have allowed him to better illuminate the nature of 
our current ideas about race. The conclusion could indeed be that race at that particular 
point in time was confused and often conflicting and that this fact mirrors the race-talk of 
today. Appiah may have opted to take his analysis further back into history to a time 
when the ideas behind race talk were more likely to cohere. Then he could present a 
clearer picture of the evolution of race talk. 
Despite the problems that have been presented, it is still not clear that Appiah's 
utilization of Jefferson and Arnold should be discounted. There are several different ways 
we can approach Taylor's concern. The first of these is quite simple. The picture that 
Taylor paints of Appiah's approach is at its best uncharitable and at its worst misleading. 
Appiah examines Jefferson's work ranging from the 1780's, where Jefferson exhibited 
the majority of his racialism, to 1808, in which he began to waiver in his more rigid 
essentialism. Jefferson entertained the idea that his prior assessment about the nature of 
blacks could have been in error. He acknowledged that the social conditions of blacks, 
both in his time and previously, may have been limiting factors preventing their talents 
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from flourishing. 85 Taylor provides examples showing competing forms of "race-talk" 
occurring between 1 830 and the l 840's, a time leading up to significant social change for 
both free and enslaved blacks. 86 As I alluded to earlier, an argument can be made ( one 
with which Appiah would no doubt agree) that the enduring consequences of racialism of 
that time period served as a catalyst of racial discourse that occurred at the black 
conventions in which Taylor derives most of his counter-examples. The admitted "anti­
racialist" and "eliminativist" strategy of these conventions supports Appiah's analysis as 
much as the dissenting voices of this strategy that Taylor has provided support his 
counter-arguments. 
For Appiah, Matthew Arnold represents racialist thinking in the late I 8th and early 
1 9th centuries, whereas the main writers who could be said to have spoken about race in 
non-essentialist or reactionary terms, such as W.E.B. Dubois began to surface after this 
time period.87 There is no doubt that both Taylor and Appiah agree that racialist thinking 
exists today and that there are persons who do not speak of race in racialist terms (Taylor 
himself being an example of the latter). The coexistence of these two ways of talking 
about race does not detract from one of Appiah' s key underlying points: that racialist 
thinking exists today and was inherited as such from previous generations. We can argue 
that non-essentialist race-talk was inherited as well, but as I have mentioned such talk can 
be interpreted as an attempt to battle racialism and its consequences whether they are 
85 CC p 46-47 in 1 79 1 ,  Jefferson makes reference to a "Negro gentleman comprehending the works of 
Euclid and in 1 808 expressed the possibility that his racialist judgments were in error and even hoped that 
they were. 
86 Taylor's primary examples were take from readings from Minutes and Proceedings of the Fifth Annual 
Convention for the Improvement of Free People of Color and Eddie S. Glaude's Princeton University 
Dissertation entitled "The Language ofNation and the National Negro Convention Movement, 1 830- 1 845" 
87 The irony here is that Taylor and Appiah disagree on whether or not Dubois was a racialist. Taylor's 
article is in large part asserting that Appiah mischaracterizes Dubois as a racialist. For benefit of this thesis, 
I shall accept that Dubois can be interpreted in either way. 
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racism or even as Appiah contends the idea of race itself. If the argument can be made 
that whatever racial dialogue took place in the past either sprang from racialism or was a 
response to racialism, Appiah may simply have regarded the inclusion of examples such 
as Taylor's as superfluous for his analysis. 
While Taylor supports a socio-historical approach to race and Appiah favors an 
eliminativist approach, there is no reason to think that the ultimate focus of their 
arguments is similar. After all, for Appiah, if racialism did not exist, then neither would 
its consequences-race and racism, whether essentialist in nature, socio-cultural, or a 
combination. As we have seen, Appiah acknowledges an understanding that there may 
be work that needs to be completed on the social and political level. He simply asserts 
that it may not be possible to talk about race on these levels without first addressing the 
racialism that not only gave birth to the idea of race, but also kept it alive over 
generations. 
Another way of approaching Taylor's challenge to Appiah's methodology is to 
revisit the technical details of Appiah's theory. As I have stated Jefferson and Arnold 
were selected because they were considered experts on the subject of race-scientific 
experts. It is not likely that questions on the scientific nature of race were deferred to 
William Watkins or even W.E.B. Dubois. Certainly, the views of these thinkers have 
influenced the current generation of social race theorists, but it is not likely that such 
views were effectively disseminated into common western scientific thought. These 
thinkers may have been considered experts on racism. However, in a predominantly 
white society they were not likely considered experts on race. 
Once again, we are able to see the types of legitimate criticisms spawned by 
Appiah's lack of an inheritance theory. An adequate inheritance theory would explain 
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why elements of classical racialism have survived over generations while also explaining 
why racialism has been given primacy over socio-historical appeals to race in the 
common culture-why the view that blacks have greater natural athletic prowess has 
survived over the idea that athletic accomplishments may be attributable to socio-cultural 
factors, and so on. If the inheritors of the historical ideas were confined to certain areas 
within the academic realm, then Taylor's argument would carry greater weight. 
However, Appiah's intention was to show that we have inherited classical racialism as a 
society writ large and that the thought that fueled this racialism was misinformed. 
Taylor offers a second objection to Appiah's racial theory. This is in regard to 
Appiah's assertion that we may need to move beyond racial identities. Taylor agrees that 
racial identities are potentially dangerous because they have the tendency to, as Appiah 
states, "go imperial" over other important aspects of our lives.88 However, he states, 
"The recognition that something carries with it a danger does not immediately 
entail that the something should be put aside, think of fire, for example, or of 
automobiles in the hands of teenagers. Specifically, if an object or device presents 
some dangers but is in other respects useful, then recognizing the danger and 
acting responsibly toward the object in question should require only that we 
proceed with care. "89 
Taylor's objection here seems plausible, primafacie. Race and racial identities may 
present danger, but can also give, for instance, a sense of commonness between persons 
or even be used as a means to address the concerns brought about by racism in the 
political world. Taylor' s  analogy is flawed, however, because he mischaracterizes 
88 cc p.  103 
89 Taylor p. 122 
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Appiah's view. It is true that fire and automobiles have beneficial and practical value. It 
may also be true that their positive value outweighs the potential dangers that come from 
their utilization. The problem is that fire and automobiles are real and objective things. 
Therefore, this analogy is inappropriate when speaking of race, because race, the 
presupposition of racial identity, is an unreal physical phenomenon. It is not simply a 
different type of thing, but it is not a thing at all. The problem for Appiah is that it is an 
unreal phenomenon that has exhibited serious negative consequences not only by causing 
overt acts of racism, but also in acting as a primary variable that shapes a large aspect of 
our lives. Even the slightest sense of the most practical utility that racial existence might 
hold carries the potential for even further negative consequences at the expense of 
autonomy and the well-being of affected persons. It is dangerous because 1 )  we tend to 
think that it is real and 2) since we think it is real we tend to think that it should determine 
how, why, and with whom we should live our lives. 
There is a more appropriate albeit controversial analogy that could shed some 
light on Appiah's viewpoint. Say, for instance, that there is a person who thinks that she 
is a product of the Christian god. Now, because she holds this belief she follows a 
narrative of her life that she be kind and giving to her fellow Christians-that she regard 
these folks as part of her moral community. She derives meaning from both her belief 
and solidarity with like-minded persons in a world of sinners. Her belief in God also 
requires that she not associate with people who are not part of her moral community, 
namely non-Christians, homosexuals, non-whites, and philosophers. Now say that there 
is evidence that God is a fictional creation. She chooses to accept this evidence, but is 
not willing to give up being a Christian. The question becomes whether the practical 
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benefits of remaining a Christian outweigh the negative consequences that being a 
Christian could bring about. 
In the above analogy, Taylor would argue that remaining a Christian could have 
some practical benefit and therefore she should remain a Christian. Appiah, however, 
would argue that despite the fact that she derives meaning from being a Christian, the 
foundation for that meaning, Jehovah, is false. Therefore, she needs to be careful about 
how central she makes Christianity in relation to her other identities, her social 
interactions, and her political commitments. After alL she would be holding on to an 
ideology that is inherently oppositional insofar as it commits her to one group while 
regarding other groups as morally deficient. 
Appiah's view is that racialism (the falsehood) has been and still is a shaping 
force in our lives. It has exacted a harsh toll on individuals and society despite its 
falseness. In its most obvious forms it has been a catalyst for discrimination, 
enslavement, and murder. Less conspicuously, however, through the belief in the 
existence of races, racialism informs our personal and social life as well as our ability to 
form a conception of the good. So, rather than trying to accentuate the positive 
consequences or combat the negative consequences of racial identity ( at the potential 
expense of the agent), our ultimate goal should be the complete dismantling of the racial 
paradigm. 
A final objection by Taylor also deals with Appiah's assertion that we may need 
move beyond race and racial identities. Taylor states, "Explicitly and consciously 
racist-and, hence, racialist-actions have, during the history of this country brought into 
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being many exclusionary practices and unjust arrangements."90 However, Taylor asserts 
that Appiah's approach eliminates the ability to appeal to race; thereby making 
ineffective what could be the most useful tool available to combat these inequalities. 91  
This objection specifically targets institutionalized and systematic manifestations of 
racialism. Taylor fears that "patterns of exclusion and systems that were once explicitly 
racist may presently be maintained by commitments to race-neutral colorblindness. "92 
I contend, however, that the above conclusion does not follow from Appiah's 
theory. As I shall later discuss, Appiah's philosophical partnership with political 
philosopher Amy Gutmann, co-author of the book Color Conscious, is a demonstration 
that an effective appeal to what has been perceived as race can still be implemented 
without having to maintain race as a central part of our identities. For now, however, I 
simply assert that Appiah sees the theoretical abolition of racial identities as something 
that is to occur after social change. Indeed, as I have mentioned, Appiah acknowledges 
that the use of racial identities when addressing racial injustice may be a necessary step to 
racial justice. This would mean at both the social level and the political level-where 
collective identities have in the past been effective for attempting to correct past racial 
injustice. 
We must remember that Appiah argues that at the end of the day, transitional 
racial identities will eventually be replaced by truly voluntary non-racial identities. 
However, Appiah's view does not exclude the recognition of a race-based polis. The 
question becomes "Is it even possible to address race-informed systematic inequalities 
without first examining the racialist foundation that gave support to these injustices?" It 
90 Ibid., p. 127 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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could be argued that as the political system begins to rid itself of racial injustice, that 
racial injustice at the social level is likely to follow suit. The problem with this 
viewpoint is that it seeks the treat the symptoms rather than the cancer itself. Such a view 
fails to acknowledge that the underlying issue for systematic racialism has been a societal 
commitment to an idea of whiteness, blackness, and race-to racialism. Significant 
social change is unlikely to occur if the root of the problem is not addressed at both the 
social and the political level. History has demonstrated this. Blacks are no longer slaves. 
Discrimination is illegal. Blacks are considered full citizens. Yet society remains largely 
segregated, income disparities exist, racism is still a fact of American life, interracial 
relationships are still largely considered taboo, and race plays a determining factor in how 
our lives are shaped. To put it simply, even as our political structure has become more 
colorblind, society simply has not. 
While Appiah does not focus his racial theory directly toward the political 
structure, it is clear that he believes that acknowledging and distancing ourselves from 
racial foundations will have positive ramifications in the political structure. Such a view 
does not require that we do or do not take up racial identities. It does require, however, 
that we at least acknowledge both that races do not exist and that racialism is a part of 
American consciousness. This view asks that we relinquish our commitment to racialism 
rather than affirm it by attempting to maintain its consequences. 
Section 2.3: Michelle Moody-Adams on Appiah's Normative Project 
Let us now turn to further criticism put forth by Michelle Moody-Adams, who, 
like Taylor, objects to Appiah's controversial views towards racial identity. Michelle 
Moody-Adams endorses the analytical approach of Appiah's theory. However, in the 
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article "A Commentary on Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race," she takes 
aim at Appiah's suggestion that we move beyond the use ofracial identities.93 
Moody-Adams holds that Appiah's reluctance to fully endorse a conception of 
black ofracial identity is unnecessary. Recall that Appiah believes that one of the 
negative consequences of even non-essentialist racial identities is that they have the 
tendency to evoke oppositional attitudes towards other racial identities. 94 Moody-Adams, 
however, believes that such a conclusion is premature. She states, "When detached from 
belief in inherited racial essences, the act of affirming a racial identity might simply be a 
way of claiming solidarity with a group of people defined by a commonality of 
experiences and shared histories ofresilience in the face of hardship."95 She holds that an 
affirmation of such racial identity is healthy if it is self-sufficient, meaning that the 
affirmation provides a basis for intra-racial solidarity and sustainability.96 Moody­
Adams points out that the types of black identity that Appiah finds problematic are the 
ones in which the purpose is to gain recognition and respect from other racial identities. 
Moody-Adams agrees with Appiah that these identities are oppositional. She further 
states that such identities are not self-sufficient and are "incompatible with autonomy" 
because they seek this recognition from persons outside of their racial group.97 
On the other hand self-sufficient black identities, according to Moody-Adams, can 
be useful both in negating the negative effects that blacks have had to endure as a 
consequence of racism and as a means to free persons from potentially dangerous 
oppositional racial identities that may require that blacks reject mainstream ( or seemingly 
93 Moody-Adams, Michelle M. "A Commentary on Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race." 
Ethics. 1 09 (January 1 999) p. 420 
�p. 103 95 Moody-Adams p. 420 96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., pp. 420-42 1 
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non-black) norms. Blacks, for instance, that reject oppositional identities will be better 
equipped to recognize the social and historical contingencies of their experiences and 
conception of self. This will allow them to benefit others by helping alleviate the 
negative consequences caused by racialism. She explains that "Appreciating these 
histories and experiences would allow them to seek ways to develop the social bases of 
healthy self respect, especially for those young black Americans whose vision is distorted 
by the oppositional conception. "98 Blacks that take up non-oppositional identities could 
assist in creating new ways to attempt to subdue the negative social influences that often 
trap blacks in harsh circumstances. They can, perhaps, help others see the contingency of 
their own situations and sense of self. Furthermore, such persons could try to provide 
culturally visible alternatives to their situations. Then, young blacks that have 
oppositional black identity could better see the limitations of that identity. They would 
see that their oppositional identity is a consequence of racialism and so they would stop 
reacting to their negative circumstances in ways that maintain the racialist structure. 
Moody-Adams contends that a non-oppositional conception of black identity could be 
successful in helping to stunt the American cultural identification process that instills in 
black youth the values that have facilitated their failure by codifying certain counter­
productive behaviors.99 
While I am sympathetic to Moody-Adams 's view, I believe that it is problematic. 
First, Moody-Adams is arguing that her conception of black identity would not violate 
one's autonomy because it is an identity that is affirmed by the agent rather persons who 
do not hold that identity. The problem with this view is that it violates autonomy on two 
98 Ibid ., p. 422 
99 Ibid . 
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levels. First, it exchanges one heteronomy for another. It rejects interracial heteronomy, 
where the black identity is governed by the need for recognition from whites. However, 
it endorses an intra-racial heteronomy in which the conception of identity will be 
contingent on recognition by other blacks. Moody-Adams 's conception of self­
sufficiency in regard to autonomy is misleading, as it appears to be as much group­
contingent as it is self-contingent. It is based on the idea the affirmation of group 
solidarity. If what makes Moody-Adams conception of black identity autonomous is that 
one seeks to affirm that identity, then it is not clear why one affrrming a black identity 
that seeks recognition from whites is not also an exercise of autonomy. As we later move 
into the discussion of Appiah' s liberalism, we shall see that Appiah does not endorse a 
group conception of autonomy, which Moody-Adams seems to be referring to when she 
uses the term "self-sufficient." Rather, Appiah values individual autonomy, which is 
why he attempts to remove race as a central identity in regard to the conception of self. 
A second way in which Moody-Adams's conception of black identity fails to be 
autonomous is in its commitment to race. Moody-Adams agrees that race is fictional. 
However, under her view of black identity one 's sense of self and life plans will still be 
shaped by an allegiance to and membership in a group constituted as a race. Indeed, the 
concept ofrace is needed to bind the common objects of black solidarity. Moody-Adams 
might argue that what binds persons together in this regard is shared experience and 
circumstances. She certainly makes this appeal. However, this is not the only appeal that 
she makes. It was not a requirement that persons share the same experiences with the 
persons that they seek to help. She also does not assert shared experiences would be 
what constitutes a black identity. Rather, she suggests that as successful blacks or as 
blacks that recognize the social and historical contingency of racism, they can help 
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persons trapped by their oppositional racial identities and their circumstances. She does 
not assert that blacks free themselves from racial categorization. To the contrary, she 
presents the affirmation of racial solidarity as autonomous action. Not only does this not 
seem to escape the charge that_ this is merely an example of collective heteronomy, but it 
also objectionable on the grounds that it does free persons from the fiction of race . 
Despite these objections to Moody-Adams position, it may be possible that, once 
again, such non-essentialist conceptions of racial identity could fall under Appiah ' s 
assertion that racial identities may be a "historically" and "strategically necessary" step 
moving beyond racism. 100 Appiah's position is that racial identities can be useful, but the 
process of identification is potentially hazardous. Therefore, we should be cautious when 
utilizing racial identities. 
Moody-Adams position appears to require that persons seek respect from blacks 
as blacks as opposed to attempting to gain recognition from whites. I will now argue, 
however, that this "self-sufficient" concept of black identity is actually inherently 
oppositional. Moody-Adams version of black identity is an attempt to battle racial 
injustice, as I have attempted to demonstrate, by an appeal to race. A problem is that her 
view is that offers a conception of race that attempts to avoid seeking recognition from 
whites while it inadvertently affirms white identity as the standard identity. The grounds 
for solidarity are shared race as blacks, shared experiences as blacks, and shared cultural 
products as blacks even if non-blacks share some of the same experiences, products, and 
even in some circumstances racial identification. At the same time, Moody-Adam's  
racial identity asks that persons take a positive conception of identity or live a more 
productive life as black people. The oppositional stance with this type of black identity is 
1 00 cc p. 98 
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inherent in the need to make one 's allegiance to a particular racial group as opposed to 
other racial groups. Her view differs from black identities that seek white recognition 
because those identities, by seeking this recognition acknowledge that the racial structure 
is hierarchical. Blacks historically have had to seek recognition and respect as blacks 
from whites to fight racial injustice. 
To better understand the oppositional nature ofboth of these conceptions of black 
identity let us imagine a team sports scenario , where team black identity represents the 
team that is not doing so well at the expense or compared to the success of team white 
identity, but who could be doing better in the competition. Team black identity, coached 
by a person trained under a politics of recognition, is going to work very hard to either 
beat team white identity or demonstrate that their team is recognized as being worthy of 
sharing the field with team white identity. In this example, the opponent is clear and so is 
the higher status of that opponent. On the other hand, if Michelle Moody-Adams were 
the coach of team black identity, she is going to focus on making sure that her players are 
able to compete to the best of their ability, that they play as a team, while making sure 
that they understand that they are in an unfair competition. In this example, there is no 
appeal to hierarchy. There is also no obvious opponent. However, by recognizing the 
fact that they are a team and that they are in a competition implies that there is indeed 
opposition. 
It is not even certain that either conception of racial identity could be effective in 
a society that clearly favors some identities over others. With both types of racial identity 
that I have just discussed, whites will likely remain to some degree as a privileged other 
as they are both the comparison group while also being the ones for whom the terms of 
the comparison are dictated. Something that exacerbates the problem of racial identities 
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is the fact both of these models do not address the fact that whites are treated as 
individuals in American society; each begins with a moral blank slate. The actions of 
white individuals generally have no bearing on the moral or social status of whites writ 
large. The creation of a hierarchical and oppositional race categorization system denied 
phenotypically marked persons an individual moral status. It does not seem plausible that 
hierarchical and/or oppositional racial identities can be successful in dismantling the 
system by affirming the values that they seek overthrow. Furthermore, even if Moody­
Adams' s version ofracial identity avoided racialist pitfalls like the problem of 
authenticity, there is the potential that unhealthy loyalties surface-loyalties based on the 
shared experience of oppression in a society where it still may be held that there is an 
oppressor. These potential opposition-based loyalties could come to mirror ones found in 
circumstances of ethnic, political, and religious unrest where shared experience, 
ideologies, geography, have, at their most extreme, led to loss of life. 
A final problem with Moody-Adams 's approach is that it does not differ 
significantly from assertions of collective racial responsibility such as demonstrated by 
the Million Man March. These approaches require that blacks collectively pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps. The problem with these types of models is that it 
affirms racist thinking by asserting that responsibility for the group's circumstances 
ultimately falls on the group itself Therefore, this conception of black identity would ask 
blacks take up the burdens brought about by racialist thinking. 
There is certainly nothing wrong with helping others endure the trials that will 
occur as a result of racialism-encouraging others to choose productive paths over more 
destructive ones, teaching other persons to recognize racial contingency, and presenting 
role models to counter perilous stereotypes. However, should this responsibility fall on 
56 
blacks? Ifwe value autonomy, should we ask people to be activists for circumstances 
beyond their control and by virtue of their designated race? Under Appiah' s  view 
racialism is inherited and accompanies racist thinking. The result is the suppression of 
individual autonomy by means of subjugation, discrimination, and the limitations of 
options that occur as the result of racial identification--all of these are validated and 
justified by the fiction of race. Why, then, should we regard it as productive to ask 
blacks, as a result of their given "black identity," to take such heavy responsibility of 
bootstrapping themselves as a group out of this condition? Appiah's approach allows us 
to question the validity of the racial paradigm in the first place, thereby destroying the 
constructs of such a paradigm in hopes of making such ad hoc approaches to the 
consequences of racialism unnecessary. The need for normative identities arose as a 
result of the creation of a racial paradigm. These identities were specifically created to 
address the concerns and consequences of racism. If Appiah' s assertion that racist 
attitudes will dissipate with "the biological category of Negro" is correct, then black 
identities like the ones offered by Michelle Moody-Adams, would become obsolete. 1 0 1  
Section 2.4: Kittrell on Appiah's Normative Project 
In this Chapter, I have examined Paul C. Taylor 's criticisms of Appiah's 
analytical project and both Taylor's and Michelle Moody-Adams' s  criticisms of the 
normative conclusions of Appiah's theory. Elsewhere in this essay, I have offered my 
own criticism of Appiah's methodology, specifically, that his theory is in serious need of 
an inheritance theory. Now, I offer a final criticism of his assertion that racial identities 
might be a necessary transition towards this end of racism. 
1 0 1  CoR p.49 
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As I have shown, Appiah successfully argues that race is a myth based on 
metaphysical fictions. Given this fact, racial identities for the purpose of reconciliation, 
even if only temporary, seems to 1) be a morally unreasonable accommodation for those 
who have trouble accepting that race does not exist, 2) be a prolonging of what should 
occur as a result of our identities being freed of racialism and 3) allow the business of 
race to proceed as usual in America even if ad hoc remedies for racial problems are being 
given. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that for Appiah racial identity is a label that is "associated 
with ascriptions by most people (where ascription involves descriptive criteria for 
applying the label) ." 102 Furthermore, if you are ascribed a collective identity as black 
American, then you acquire a set of rules governing your behavior or "scripts." Appiah 
acknowledges that scripts are a feature of all collective identities. 1 03 Even racial 
identities that can exist without an appeal to racial essences will carry racial scripts based 
on a falsehood--race. Yet, Appiah reluctantly endorses these identities. I argue that it is 
risky, at best, to embrace these identities that hold such powerful influences on society 
even if they might have some type of positive normative value . 
As an example let us imagine the following: a small group of persons with brown 
eyes are placed in a commune of green-eyed people. The green-eyed people assign 
themselves identity G and label persons with brown eyes as having identity B. Those 
assigned identity B are also assigned a morally significant set of characteristics that are 
considered entailed by that identity. Eventually, the two groups begin to form intra­
group bonds, so much so that life choices made by members of each group are informed 
102 cc p.8 1 
1 03 Ibid., p. 97 
58  
consciously and unconsciously by appeals to group membership. So, persons with 
identity B now have identities and conceptions of self that are distinct from those who 
hold identity G. The assignment of identity B was act of opposition and therefore identity 
B inherently oppositional. This identity has intra-group importance, as it is a significant 
reason why two brown-eyed persons identify with one another rather persons with green 
eyes. Therefore, we can say that the assignment of identities connects individuals to 
similarly assigned persons. Finally, membership in the group that holds identity B has an 
effect on the way that persons with that identity view themselves as individuals by 
shaping their wants, desires, values. Both their intra-social communal bonds with 
members sharing identity B and their inter-social differences with persons that have 
identity G reinforce these wants, desires, and values. It should be clear that identities as 
laid out here would ultimately have consequences for both groups. However, for persons 
with identity B, the negative consequence will be more overt and potentially more 
detrimental. 
Now let us take this analogy a step further. Let us say that both group G and 
group B discover that there are no real intrinsic differences between them; that is, the 
basis G-B dichotomy is false. This does not mean that groups G and B, the institutions 
and lingering animosities created as a result of the assignment of identity will 
immediately dissipate. The question here is: What is the best course of action to facilitate 
solidarity between the two groups divided as a result of falsehood? Appiah would argue 
that collective identities are a temporarily suitable means to help this eventual unity. I 
contend, however, that it is morally unfair to . endorse that the agents continue to 
internalize the false identities, even restructured non-essentialist versions, by continuing 
to appeal to such identities beyond the purposes of 1 )  sharing experiences or 2) pointing 
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out systematic injustices that have occurred as a result of creation of the dichotomy. Use 
of racial identity in this regard is merely a matter of reporting facts rather than 
affirmation of the racial structure. It does not require that we keep race as central to our 
sense of self. Rather, it allows us to explain and understand the racial paradigm so that 
we can best come up with a means to disassemble it. 
However, a view suggesting that people utilize such identities when it may not be 
necessary and when the underlying foundations of these identities are falsehoods is 
morally flawed. One can argue that permitting such identities to exist and requiring them 
to exist are different things. Substantively, these are actions are quite different. 
However, the result of these actions is the same if it means that racial identities continue. 
The existence of these identities may mean remedying the consequences of the racial 
system, but it affirms the status quo at is very foundations. By doing so it makes the task 
of removing race as central to our identities slower and more difficult as well as 
facilitating an environment where new racial injustices may begin to spawn. 
I contend that there needs to be an alternative means to racial identity that will 
bring about an end to racism. At its best, racial -identity will only act as a treatment for 
the symptoms of a deadly cancer rather than a cure. The goal then, should be not to 
simply dismantle the structure created by fictions, but also to collectively dispose of these 
fictions--the fictions that are the underlying causes for racism. Requiring persons and 
governments to acknowledge that oppression occurred as a result of fiction takes away 
the justifications to continue with the status quo. Furthermore, it gives justification to 
remedy injustice that has occurred as result of the fiction by exposing the problem as a 
societal or cultural problem, rather than one limited to the confines of particular groups. 
In other words, collective responsibility in regard to racial justice extends to all social 
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members and all of our institutions. Given Appiah 's reluctance to endorse these racial 
identit ies, there is little doubt that he understands that social change should not simply be 
put in the hands of groups that he seeks to dismantle. However, it is neither efficient nor 
reasonable to allow past structures to continue when there is another optional available. 
In sum, this option is to take Appiah' s eliminativism to its full conclusion; that is, not 
simply to decentralize race from our identities, rather to push for its removal from our 
conception of personhood. 
The risk of not removing race will be that the process of racial identification may 
begin to re-secure intra-racial bonds created as a result of racialism. These bonds can 
give new life to and re-codify themselves. There has been evidence of this occurrence 
historically. Two examples are the Black Nationalist and Afrocentric movements, which 
support the idea of racial identities, and arose as a rejection of both negative racialist 
notions ( about blacks) and as a response to the mistreatment that occurred as a result of 
such notions. While both of these movements eventually dissipated, the reactionary­
racialism trickled down into the black masses. Where racial and ideological walls should 
have broken, the racialist foundations were reinforced. The result is that philosophers 
like Appiah are left in the position of having to convince both whites AND blacks that 
race is a social construction built on a foundation of racialism. Given this difficulty, 
Appiah should avoid accommodation and instead affrrm what he asserts to be true, that 
"there are no races." 1 04 Hence, he should stress that racial identities are neither the 
temporary nor ultimate solution to the problem of racialism. Rather, only the rejection of 
race will do. 
1 04Ibid. , p. 7 1  
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Any solution that requires that persons maintain identities is only likely to 
reaffirm the status quo. This is especially true in the contemporary context, in which 
ideas of "whiteness" and "blackness" are not only accepted but also often celebrated in 
mainstream American culture. If ideas such as these prevail, even without racialism, they 
will likely gamer a new set of commitments, new terms of authenticity, and a murkier 
groundwork for a re-emergence of racism. The possibility of a non-essentialist 
conception of racial identity without potentially dangerous life scripts that takes 
autonomy seriously is dubious. If it is possible, then neither Appiah, Taylor, nor Moody­
Adams have demonstrated it . Appiah's tentative suggestion that we move beyond 
collective identities suggests that such a conception of identity would be difficult. 
Furthermore, he fails to demonstrate why collective racial identities might be necessary. 
Considering the above, perhaps a non-racial conception of personhood is ultimately the 
key to bringing about an end to racial injustice. 
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Chapter 3 :  The Moral and Political Liberalism of K. Anthony Appiah 
Section 3.1 :  Introduction 
In this previous section, I have considered several criticisms of Appiah's theory. 
It is now important that we attempt to establish a better understanding of Appiah's theory 
by exploring some substantive foundations and the motivations of his philosophical 
endeavor. In the following sections, I will briefly explore the primary foundations 
underlying Appiah's nonnative conclusions about race; that is, a commitment to moral 
and political liberalism. 
Section 3.2: Appiah's Liberal Principles 
There are several elements that are crucial in attempting to understand Appiah's 
liberalism. These are the values of identity, self-creation, individuality, and dignity. We 
have already talked at some length about identities; remember, that there are two 
dimensions of identity: personal (intelligent, kind, etc) and collective (race, gender, 
sexuality). Appiah holds that identities are constituted in social life. 1 05 In Appiah's 
liberal vision, the idea of identity is synonymous with a "plan of life." For Appiah, a plan 
of life does not resemble "an architects plan." Rather he states, "a plan of life is more like 
a set of distinctive and organizing aims--aims within which you can fit your daily choices 
and long-term vision." 1 06 In other words, an identity will not tell us how to live our lives. 
Rather, it will supply us with a framework and tools with which we can direct our lives. 
The concept of self-creation refers to our ability to construct our own lives by 
choosing from the various identities that our social world makes available to us through 
our personal lives, family, and society. This self-creation acts as an expression of our 
1 05 "Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity." Critical Inquiry 27 (Winter 200 1 )  p. 320-321 
1 06 Ibid., p. 3 1 9-320 
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individuality, because we choose identities freely and for ourselves. The ideals of self­
creation and individualism constitute what I take to be Appiah's conception of autonomy, 
the idea of self-governing. Appiah endorses liberalism because it "takes this picture 
seriously and tries to construct a society which is possible ." 1 07 
It would be a mistake to think Appiah rejects all collective identities, especially 
not the ones in which you have choices and the ability to control. However, he states, "if 
the criteria for ascribing a certain identity include things over which you have no control­
as is the case with race, gender and sexual orientation-then whether you identify with 
that identity . . .  is not only up to you." 108 As we have seen, the problem with a collective 
identity such as race is that it tends to take control over other identities (by altering their 
scripts) and by limiting our ability to even choose identities. Given Appiah's 
commitments to the liberal values that I have given, coupled with the nature of dangerous 
collective identities, Appiah's reluctance to fully endorse racial identities is made more 
lucid. Simply put, these types of racial identities are illiberal insofar as they limit our 
autonomy. We do not control these identities. Rather, such identities control us tend to 
control us. 
A final value for Appiah is the idea of dignity, or respect. 1 09 This respect would 
entail an appreciation for the other values. He states, " . . .  there is something that holds 
together our liberal ideals. That is the idea of the dignified life . . . . individuality is part of 
any such life and that that is one reason why we should have liberal and political 
institutions in a liberal society. " 1 1° For Appiah, the racialist blueprint is in itself illiberal 
1 07 Ibid., p. 329 
1 08 Ibid., p.323 109 Ibid., p. 309-3 1 1  
1 10 Ibid., p. 33 1 
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because it fails to tak e id entities seriously; by its v ery nature it is incapable of d oing so. 
If the conclusions that A ppiah mak es follow ing his analysis of racialism are tru e, then it 
is clear that his commitment to L iberalism fu els his racial analysis. 
The prev ious q uote d emonstrates that A ppiah' s liberal scope is limited not only to 
the moral, but also to the political. R acialism has resulted in grav e inj ustices in A merican 
society. A merica has a history of systematic di scrimination and political exclu sion. 
W hile some of these injustices hav e been corrected, black s  tod ay are still d isadv antaged 
both politically and economically as a result of this historical legacy of racialism. 
Furt hermore, the fact that most persons in A merican society still believ e  in racialist 
notions means that systematic racism w ill no d oubt continu e to be an in herent p art of our 
political parad igm. 
A ppiah attemp ts to combat racialism at its social found ations. H ow ev er, his 
id eological marriage w ith notable liberal think er A my G utman n, fur ther d emons trates 
that this battle must also tak e place at the political lev el. The theoretical alliance of these 
tw o i ntellectuals also show s  that A ppiah' s eliminativ ism need not thw art political 
progr ess as Taylor suggests. R ather, as w e  shall now see, its application at the political 
lev el giv es clarity to w hat is need ed to secure social justice and fairn ess. 
I n  th e art icle "R esp ond ing to R acial I njustice" app earing in Color Conscious, 
A my G utmann argues that we should ev aluate our p olitical institutions morally. She 
hold s that the A merican institution is racially unjust toward s black s. Sh e asserts that 
racial injustice is " not simply d eriv ativ e of economic and ed ucational injustice, howev er 
much it is exacerbated by inj ustices in these realms." She goes on to say that "P rinciples 
of economic and ed ucational eq uity therefore are inad eq uate to resolv e  the problem of 
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racial injustice." 1 1 1  Gutmann's concern here is that given the above conclusion, color­
blind remedies are not going to be able to adequately serve the demands of justice. This is 
because racial injustice stems from something that is more complex, deep, and divisive: a 
still present racialism. 
As I have stated Appiah focuses more directly on the personal and social sphere. 
The crux ofGutmann's work can be seen as a continuation of Appiah's claim that we 
move beyond identities; she commits to the political sphere drawing from the personal 
and social spheres. In order to combat racialism she proposes what she calls "color 
conscious" policies over color blind and race conscious policies. She states that color 
consciousness, 
" . . .  rejects race as an essential, natural division among human beings and also 
rejects the idea that there are morally relevant differences that correspond to racial 
division among human beings. Color consciousness entails an awareness of the 
way in which individuals have historically come to be identified by superficial 
phenotypical differences-such as skin color and facial features--that serve as the 
bases for invidious discriminations and other injustices associated with race." 1 1 2 
So, color conscious policies would take into account the racialism that Appiah has 
stressed all along by recognizing that racialism is an inherent part of the way that racial 
injustice has been carried out against blacks socially and economically. Gutmann 
differentiates such a view from colorblind policies, which would not take race (and racial 
injustice) into account or race consciousness, which presupposes the legitimacy of 
1 1 1  cc  p. 1 08 
1 1 2 Ibid., p. 163 
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metaphysical racial classifications. 1 1 3 So, it is clear why Appiah would ally his theory 
with Gutmann' s approach because it is consistent with his view that while race should not 
have been be a factor in people ' s  lives that racialism has affected persons negatively on 
every level. In the epilogue of Color Conscious Appiah addresses the question of 
whether government should be color blind by saying "That the reasonable answer is that 
the government can't be color blind because society isn't . . . "1 1 4 Adding Gutmann's 
political dimension to Appiah's work is important. The overall result is a more holistic 
vision that both exposes the root of racial inequalities and provides reconciliatory 
methodology that does not require that we affirm the racial system. 
Let us now return to Paul Taylor 's final criticism from the previous section: that 
Appiah's eliminativist view would facilitate the continued existence of unjust institutions 
and that Appiah's view strips away the most efficient tool in fixing those institutions. As 
demonstrated by Gutmann, a normative remedy does not require the use of racial 
identities to be effective in combating the consequences of racialism nor does it entail 
color-blind application at the political level. Furthermore, Appiah has shown his 
commitment to the ideals of liberalism such as individuality, identity, justice and human 
dignity. By allowing these ideals to be violated would be both morally irresponsible and 
counterintuitive to his liberal vision. As I have shown in this Chapter, racial identities 
pose a threat to these ideals. Therefore, what has been brought to light is that his 
responsibility to liberal principles is his central foundation and thus provides a basis for 
( l )  his exposition of the nature of the race concept, (2) his assertion that racial identities 
would be a more efficient replacement for race, and (3) his statement that ultimately 
1 1 3 Ibid., p. 1 63 
1 1 4 Ibid., p. 1 8 1  
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racial identities themselves could potentially stunt the flourishing that should be 
promoted in the liberal democratic picture. 
Appiah eloquently states, "I look forward to taking up, along with others, the 
fruitful imaginative work of constructing co llective identities for a democratic nation in a 
world of democratic nations; work that must go hand in hand with cultivating democracy 
here and encouraging it elsewhere." 1 1 5 We see that in order to realize Appiah's most 
important vision, we must move beyond our racial collective identities and take up a 
more unified collective identity-one that we create, not that is assigned to us; that is, a 
collective human identity. And, once we cease operating as a racially divided society we 
can instead begin to lay foundations that will permit us to better acknowledge ourselves 
as unified and democratic collective. 
1 1 5  Ibid., p. 1 05 
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Conclusion 
Despi te the fact that evi d ence d oes not support the exi sten ce of human races, race 
sti ll hol d s  si gnifi cant meani ng i n  the Ameri can consci ousness. R ace, oft en op erati ng 
un d er the gui se of cul ture, i s  sti ll an infl uenti al and p atern ali sti c  force in shapi ng our 
liv es. O ur soci ety con ti nu es to gr ow i n  i ts div ersi ty. H ow ev er, i f  w e  are to liv e i n  
harmon y, to expect fairn ess and j usti ce i n  our cultural , soci al , and p oli ti cal in sti tuti ons, 
w e  n eed to ask ourselv es: d o  w e  seek to resembl e a heterogeneous sal ad i n  a bowl , or d o  
w e  seek i nstead to be the homogenous i ngredi ents of the great mel ti ng p ot that thi s  
country cl ai ms to be? I f  w e  d esire the former then p erhap s  w e  need to mai ntain the 
raci ali st currency that w e  hav e been giv en-t he currency that pi ts us agai nst each other 
soci all y, poli ti call y, p ersonally, an d metap hysi call y. I f  our answ er i s  the l atter, then, 
perhap s, w e  n eed to consi d er changi ng out our exi sti ng curren cy. T hen w e  can create a 
new on e that al low s  us to recov er from our curr ent soci al , p oli ti cal an d moral d efici t. 
I n  thi s  essay, I hav e expl ored the analyti cal exami nati on and d econstructi on of 
race i n  Western soci ety, by Kw ame Anthony Appi ah. H e  has attemp ted to d emonstrate 
that our mod em con cep ti on of race w as in heri ted from a tradi ti on of metap hysi cal 
essenti ali sm that w as able to emerge ov er other form s of race talk of the d ay. I hav e 
argued that Appi ah's approach i s  successfu l i n  w hat i t  seek s  to accompli sh d espi te havi ng 
d efici enci es. Appi ah's app roach i s  effectiv e i n  und ermi ni ng raci ali st thinkin g because 
rather than i nv esti ng ti me and energy in challengi ng the conseq uences of raci ali st 
thinki ng, i t  attemp ts to uncov er the truth that raci ali sm has so fa r  been mask ed i n  
Ameri can soci ety-that races d o  not exi st ap art from our i d eas and human constru cti on. 
W hil e thi s cl ai m i s  certai nly not a new clai m i n  the w orl d of cri ti cal race theory, Appi ah 
i s  uniq ue i nsofar as he recogni zes that the long life giv en to race i s  n ot one that can 
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simply be frustrated by appeals to science, class, nor can it be explained away by a socio­
historical approach. Race has prevailed over these adversaries historically because they 
have failed to consider the less apparent collusions at its core-racialism: a mixed bag of 
faulty science, inductive assumptions, biased anthropology and elusive metaphysics. In 
uncovering these aspects Appiah has had great success. 
Now we can ask the questions "Will we . . . .  " or "How will we unravel ourselves 
from racialist entanglement?" I have suggested in this essay, that we should move 
completely beyond an appeal to race for our answers and moved towards recognizing our 
racial contingencies and attempt to pack race away with the other chimeras and goblins of 
our metaphysical histories. Then and only then will there be hope that we can forge our 
own identities free from the binds of race. How can we do this? I contend that it is time 
to do what there seemingly has not been any attempt to do in our racialism-laden 
society-we should expose the fictions of race to the masses by means such 
demonstrating its history as Appiah has done. We should end our reluctance to let go of 
racialism by unleashing the knowledge that has been accepted by sciences: there are no 
races. It may mean that we leave the ivory tower for this important issue. However, until 
this mission is completed, ad hoc solutions to racial problems will largely will be 
rendered ineffective, barely making a dent, and falling on mostly deaf ears. Meanwhile, 
we will still be left with our fictionally based conception of racial personhood. People 
will go on with their lives denying themselves the ability to construct their life plans, 
attempting to live up to expectations of their designated categories, concealing from 
themselves what in Appiah 's view are of the most fundamental values of liberalism--­
autonomy and human dignity. For now, we can share with Appiah a cautious optimism 
and remember that we are made not of one, but many identities. We can tuck away into 
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our consciousness that "Racial identity can be the basis of resistance to racism; but even 
as we struggle against racism--and though we have made great progress, we have further 
still to go-let us not let our racial identities subject us to new tyrannies." 1 1 6  
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